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 Foreword
The past has a funny habit of repeating itself. As the 
third industrial revolution took hold in the 1970s, 
we expected to see a dramatic improvement in 
productivity. But, as the US economist Robert 
Solow quipped at the time: you see the computer 
age everywhere but in the productivity statistics. 
Of course, it can take years for economic benefits 
to become apparent. Yet, as the fourth industrial 
revolution starts to take off now, we face a similar 
paradox. Productivity remains a significant 
challenge to Scotland and the UK as a whole, with 
the Office for Budget Responsibility last month 
downgrading its forecasts for the next four years.
Combined with ongoing economic fragility, 
political uncertainty, and an aging workforce, its 
evident that this weeks Scottish Budget comes 
at a profoundly important time for Scotland  a 
fact reflected throughout this latest Economic 
Commentary from the Fraser of Allander Institute. 
The question is, what can the Scottish Government 
do to help solve the productivity conundrum and 
help the economy to grow? 
Investment in technology, education, skills, and 
infrastructure are good places to start. 
The Edinburgh City Region Deal, announced earlier 
this year, was a major step in the right direction. 
Within the £1.1 billion package are pledges to 
create one of the worlds leading data innovation 
centres, train 100,000 data scientists, as well as 
set up a regional skills development programme  
all of which should help boost productivity.
We may also see more initiatives such as the 
Scottish Governments launch of a £4 million fund 
to attract the worlds brightest entrepreneurs to 
Scotland and help them develop their ideas for 
businesses. 
This should add to the sense of confidence 
and purpose we saw from our community of 
entrepreneurs at this years Entrepreneurial 
Scotland Awards in November, an event Deloitte 
were proud to sponsor once again. 
More initiatives like these are likely to follow in the 
years ahead. But, whatever happens, the Scottish 
Government has the task of setting the right 
balance of policies which can tackle the challenges 
we face. Unlike Solows witticism suggests, looking 
beyond the immediate horizon is likely to be part 
of the answer. 
John Macintosh 
Tax Partner
Deloitte
 December 2017
Long-term thinking could be key to Scotlands productivity challenge
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This weeks Scottish Budget (14.12.17) comes at a 
crucial time for Scotlands economy. 
With Brexit uncertainty continuing to cast a shadow, 
plus a gloomier outlook for UK productivity, the 
Budget provides an important opportunity for the 
Scottish Government to set out their plans to support 
the Scottish economy. 
The Budget will also mark the first time that 
we will have forecasts from the new Scottish 
Fiscal Commission (SFC). The SFC will provide an 
independent assessment of the outlook for the 
economy, devolved taxes and social security. 
They will do so against a backdrop of ongoing 
economic fragility. Growth in Scotland slowed 
to just 0.1% over the 3-months to June. Over the 
year, growth has been around 1/3 that of the UK. 
In contrast, employment continues to be close to a 
record high  at least since the Labour Force Survey 
started in 1992. The downside has been further falls 
in productivity. 
The latest leading indicators suggest that the 
economy is continuing to grow, albeit at a relatively 
slow pace. The Scottish FAI/RBS Scottish Business 
Monitor for Q3 2017 showed both a rise in business 
and new orders. Our latest survey of activity in the oil 
and gas sector shows a further pick-up in optimism, 
although conditions remain challenging. 
With this backdrop, it is vital that the Budget sets out 
a clear vision for how the government will help take 
advantage of the significant economic opportunities 
we know will exist in the future  whether that 
is boosting entrepreneurship and innovation, 
supporting the development and use of new 
technologies or tapping in to growing international 
markets. 
Summary
With economic uncertainty likely to remain a dominant 
feature for the foreseeable future, focussing on where 
government can make a difference in the long-term is 
vital. 
But with the Scottish block grant for day-to-day 
spending falling in real-terms over the next two years 
(at least), and the Scottish Fiscal Commission likely to 
forecast weaker devolved tax revenues than had been 
expected this time last year, the Finance Secretary 
will be forced to take some big decisions, not just on 
how to balance the budget and support growth, but 
to deliver on key manifesto commitments. The likely 
squeeze on unprotected budgets  such as non-ring 
fenced local government  looks stark. The outlook 
for capital is much healthier. And the near £1bn of 
financial transactions announced in the Autumn 
Budget provides an opportunity to be innovative. 
On balance, the combination of over two years of 
weak growth, a projected decline in Scotlands 
working age population, and ongoing challenges in 
the oil and gas sector, mean that Scotland will do 
well to match UK growth over the next few years. 
That being said, we forecast that the Scottish 
economy will continue to grow over our forecast 
period (2018, 2019 and 2020). Our latest forecasts 
are for growth of 1.2% in 2018, 1.4% in 2019 and 
1.4% in 2020.
How this weak outlook will impact on the Scottish 
budget depends, in part, on how the key determinants 
of income tax  employment and wages  are affected 
in the short-run. 
It is not inconceivable that weaker revenue forecasts 
from the Scottish Fiscal Commission could offset, at 
least in part, some of any tax hike proposed by the 
Scottish Government. 
Fraser of Allander Institute 
December 2017
5Economic Commentary, December 2017
Fraser of Allander Institute
At a glance
FAI forecast: Scottish GVA growth and by sector 
2018 2019 2020
GVA 1.2 1.4 1.4
Production 1.4 1.6 1.2
Construction 0.7 0.9 0.5
Services 1.2 1.4 1.5
FAI forecast: Scottish GVA growth 
Growth set to continue to 2020 but to remain fragile and below trend Growth to rise to 1.4% in 2019 but forecasts revised down from Sept
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Outlook and Appraisal 
Decembers Scottish Budget comes at a crucial time. Growth remains below trend and Brexit continues to 
create uncertainty. The political focus will no doubt be on any proposed changes to income tax. But with 
rising demand for public services and tight resources a wider debate is needed about the sustainability of 
key spending priorities and how to boost economic growth in Scotland.  
Introduction
The Scottish economy grew by just 0.1% in the 
second quarter of 2017. Annual growth has risen 
to 0.5%, but is still well below trend and a third of 
the rate in the UK. (Chart 1)
Conditions remain challenging, but most surveys 
point to growth  albeit modest  next year.  
In contrast, the labour market continues to hold 
up well, with employment close to a record high. 
(Table 1) 
However with limited growth in the wider economy, 
Scottish productivity has slipped. Output per hour 
 the key measure of labour productivity  is down
by around 4% since 2015. (Chart 2)
Weak productivity has been a feature of the UK 
economy since the financial crisis. 
The UK Governments Industrial Strategy is an 
attempt to tackle this with targeted industry support 
and investment in R&D and new technologies. 
The Scottish Government has an opportunity to 
set out its vision for the economy in the Budget. 
Following a speech in August when the First 
Minister signalled a new approach, businesses 
will be looking carefully at the detail of the Budget, 
particularly if  as now seems certain  taxes will 
increase for many. 
With devolved finances continuing to be squeezed 
and expensive manifesto commitments to be paid 
for in health and education, one-year sticking 
plasters in the form of tax rises can only help for so 
long. A strategy for managing demand, prioritising 
where money is spent and growing the economy is 
now needed more than ever.
Chart 1: Scottish economic growth (%), since 2013
Source: Scottish Government, Q2 GDP
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Table 1: UK labour market rates, July-September 2017
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey (Nov 17)
Employment
(16-64)
Unemployment
(16+)
Inactivity
(16-64)
Scotland 75.2 4.0 21.6
England 75.4 4.3 21.2
Wales 72.5 4.1 24.2
N. Ire 68.1 4.0 28.9
UK 75.0 4.3 21.6
Chart 2: Scottish productivity since 1998 trend vs. outturn
Source: Scottish Government, Q2 Productivity
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The global economy
This time last year, the outlook for the global 
economy was very different. 
The Euro Area was struggling and there were fears 
for the stability of some emerging economies 
 including China. At the same time, the UK was
confounding expectations of a post-EU referendum 
slowdown and was on track to be one of the fastest 
growing economies in the G7.  
Fast forward and we now have a weaker UK economy 
with higher inflation and lower growth. (Chart 3). 
In contrast, global growth is projected to be over 
3.5% this year, rising to 3.75% in 2018  the fastest 
rate since 2010. (Table 2). 
Europe is more buoyant, with confidence at its 
highest since the financial crisis. (Chart 4)
Two points are worth reflecting upon.
Firstly, it can be easy for the short-term outlook 
to dominate debates and day-to-day activities. 
No matter the immediate outlook, for businesses, 
focussing on the long-term and strategies for value 
and growth is key.  
Secondly, there are opportunities for Scotland to 
tap into renewed global optimism (particularly in 
emerging economies). We currently export 60% 
more to Ireland than we do to China and as much 
to Luxembourg as to India  so there is scope to do 
much better. (Chart 5)
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream 
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Table 2: OECD forecasts for G7 Growth: 2016 (outturn) to 2019
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
2016 2017 2018 2019
UK 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.1
US 1.5 2.2 2.5 2.1
Japan 1.0 1.5 1.2 1.0
Canada 1.5 3.0 2.1 1.9
Euro Area 1.8 2.4 2.1 1.9
Germany 1.9 2.5 2.3 1.9
France 1.1 1.8 1.8 1.7
Italy 1.1 1.6 1.5 1.3
Chart 3: Latest IMF forecasts compared to those made in April 
2016  change in outlook for growth and inflation 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook
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Chart 4: Rising consumer confidence in Europe  in contrast to 
the UK where the outlook has turned gloomier Chart 5: Emerging markets to drive growth over next few years  
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Developing new markets is crucial, particularly 
when UK domestic demand is weak and Brexit 
poses a challenge to established trade links. 
Leaving the EU undoubtedly represents the 
greatest change for our economy in a generation. 
Alongside trade relations, it will undoubtedly have 
an impact on sources of future investment and 
the supply of workers. At the same time, future 
economic and financial policy could look quite 
different. 
There remains significant uncertainty about the 
costs and benefits of Brexit. Much will depend 
upon how policymakers react, both within and 
outwith the UK. 
Key points of policy to be agreed include:  
1. The terms of (Br)exit
2. The transition to any new arrangement
3. The long-term economic, political and social
relationship between the UK and the EU
Significant progress has been made on part 1 - 
with a deal on finances, EU citizens and the Irish 
border. However, the scale of the task in ensuring 
a smooth exit from the EU remains challenging.   
For example, around 135,000 jobs in Scotland are 
estimated to be supported by demand from EU 
exports, both directly and through the spill-over 
effects into the wider economy. (Table 3)
Careful prioritisation of sector needs will be 
important in any trade deal. The priorities for 
Scotland and the UK may not necessarily align 
 with many of the most important sectors for
Scotland less significant at the UK level. (Table 4)
As always, the outlook for Scotland will depend, in 
part, upon the outlook for global oil prices. 
The latest FAI assessment of the industry suggests 
that optimism continues to recover. (Chart 6).  
This reflects, in part, the action taken to reduce 
costs, improve production efficiency and diversify 
to help support long-term sustainability.
Chart 6: Latest FAI/AGCC Oil and Gas Survey: Autumn 2017  
rising optimism  amongst firms in the UKCS
Source:  FAI - AGCC 27 Oil and Gas Survey
Table 3: Scottish employment supported by external demand, 
2014 Q3 2016 to Q2 2017
Source: HMRC Regional Trade Statistics
Scotland UK
Growth Sector EU rank
% of sector 
exports
EU rank
Petroleum & related 1 67.5% 2
Beverages 2 31.1% 20
Fish & crustaceans 3 77.4% 30
General machinery 4 34.2% 6
Electronic machinery 5 51.7% 7
Miscellaneous goods 6 63.4% 4
Chemicals and products 7 83.3% 17
Gas, natural & 
manufactured
8 83.3% 21
Power generating 
machinery 
9 13.9% 8
Medicinal & pharma 10 53.0% 5
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Table 4: Top 10 Scottish goods exports to EU  by value and rank 
Source: Fraser of Allander
EU exports Non-EU exports rUK exports
Direct 80,300 115,500 337,300
Indirect 33,000 49,700 144,200
Induced 21,100 30,500 82,700
Total 134,400 195,700 564,200
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The price of oil has risen steadily over the past six 
months  helping to support profitability across 
the oil and gas sector. (Chart 7).
This has been helped by sharp reductions in costs. 
The UK Oil and Gas Authority estimate that average 
unit costs in the North Sea have fallen by a third 
from £18 per barrel in 2014 to £12 per barrel in 
2016. 
For Scotlands wider economy this is a 
double-edged sword. On the one hand, ensuring 
the sustainability of the oil and gas sector is clearly 
a positive, but in the short-term, these reductions 
in spend  including on wages and salaries  are 
having a major impact on the economy of the North 
East. 
Looking forward, the outlook for investment 
 whilst more positive than 12 months ago 
continues to remain weak. Only eight appraisal
wells were spudded in 2016 (the lowest since
1971) and overall investment is down nearly 50%
on 2014 levels. (Chart 8).
The Chancellors announcement in the Budget 
on historical tax reliefs provides a further new 
initiative to try and help prolong the longevity of 
the sector. 
The UK economy
Overall UK growth has slowed in 2017, with annual 
growth of just 1.5% (below trend of >2%). 
That being said, quarterly growth picked up over 
the summer (Jul  Sep) to 0.4%. This was faster 
than the 0.3% growth recorded in each quarter of 
the first half of the year. (Chart 9).
Back in March, the OBR predicted growth of 2.0% 
in 2017. Short of a much larger than expected 
pick-up in Q4  close to 0.8%  this is now unlikely. 
The OBRs latest forecast is for growth of just 1.5% 
in 2017. 
A key driver of this slower growth has been weaker 
construction sector output (which had been a 
strong driver of growth since 2013) and higher 
than anticipated inflation weakening consumer 
demand. (Chart 10).
Chart 7: Oil prices to remain subdued: providing stability for the 
North Sea but limited scope for investment
Source: IMF, Thomson Reuters Datastream 
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Chart 8: Expenditure on UKCS North Sea (2006 to 2016): sharp 
fall in capital investment and operating costs
Source: ONS, Preliminary Q3 GDP 
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Chart 9: UK economic growth  upturn in Q3 but growth still 
below trend and annual growth slowing over the year
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As Chart 11 highlights, consumer spending had 
been the key driver of growth in 2015 and 2016. 
NB: The volatility between Gross Capital Formation 
and net trade reflects a technical issue regarding 
the trading of precious metals on the London 
Bullion market. The UKs non-gold trade position 
was broadly constant over this period.
The slowdown in consumer spending during 2017 
reflects the ongoing squeeze on real wages and 
household budgets. (Chart 12)
After recovering during 2015 and 2016, the fall in 
the pound and spike in import prices has meant 
that real earnings are falling once more. 
The IFS believe that average real earnings are on 
course to be £1,400 a year lower in 2021 than was 
forecast in 2016. They also believe that it will be 
well into the next decade before earnings return to 
their pre-financial crisis levels.  
CPI inflation is now 3%. Within that, food and 
non-alcoholic drink inflation is now 4.1%, the 
highest since 2013. This alongside rising fuel and 
transport costs are driving the increase in overall 
inflation. (Chart 13)
Such increases are all the more challenging for 
those on lower incomes as such purchases make 
up a larger proportion of day-to-day spending. 
The expectation is that price pressures will start to 
ease in the months ahead, although  even with 
the recent increase in interest rates  inflation is 
on track to be above target for the next 3 years. 
Chart 10: Economic performance of broad sectors of UK 
economy since 2012 
Source: ONS, Thomson Reuters Datastream
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Chart 11: Components of UK growth since 2015  private 
consumption remains the consistent net driver
Source: ONS, Thomson Reuters Datastream
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Chart 12: UK regular average weekly earnings growth: 3-month 
on a year ago 
Source: ONS, Thomson Reuters Datastream
Chart 13: Drivers of UK CPI inflation
Source: ONS, Thomson Reuters Datastream
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Despite these pressures, current indicators of 
day-to-day economic activity continue to show 
resilience. 
The closely watched UK Purchasing Managers 
Index (PMI) for services, manufacturing and 
construction, all show businesses reporting 
growth. As with the official statistics, construction 
is the weakest. (Chart 14)
In contrast however, measures of underlying 
confidence amongst businesses remains fragile. 
The latest CBI confidence indicators have once 
again turned negative  reflecting current 
perceptions of the Brexit negotiations. (Chart 15)
The ZEW Economic Sentiment Index for the UK also 
declined further in December. 
This suggests that whilst businesses are getting 
on with the job, they remain nervous about the 
outlook. If this fragility in confidence was to take 
a further blow, then it may not take much for it to 
have an impact on the real economy. 
One area where weak confidence is showing up 
in terms of actual activity is investment. Business 
investment has been treading water in the UK for 
the best part of two years. (Chart 16)
This is clearly a concern as investment is believed 
to be one of the most important drivers of long-term 
productivity and competitiveness. 
Some of the weakness in investment will 
undoubtedly reflect Brexit-driven uncertainties 
weighing on confidence. 
But it also appears to be part of a longer-term 
trend. Tackling this track record of weak private 
sector investment  remember investment in the 
UK has been lower than in many other countries for 
a number of years  will be crucial. 
This is one motivation behind the UK Governments 
industrial strategy and the Scottish Governments 
plans for a National Investment Bank. 
Chart 14: Latest UK PMI still shows underlying resilience in 
economy despite uncertainty (>50 marks expansion) 
Source: IHS Markit
Chart 15: CBI measures of confidence  show heightened 
nervousness amongst firms large and small
Source: CBI, Thomson Reuters Datastream
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Chart 16: Official statistics show sustained weak business 
investment in the UK for over 2 years
Source: ONS, Thomson Reuters Datastream 
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This low level of investment  coupled with a tight 
labour market  has led policymakers (including 
the Bank of England), to believe that even modest 
growth will erode the remaining spare capacity in 
the economy. If this was to happen, the pressure 
on inflation will become even more acute. 
For example despite recent weak rates of growth, 
UK manufacturing is operating at its highest level 
of capacity utilisation since 2007. (Chart 17) 
We can see similar constraints in the labour 
market. Chart 18 shows a range of measures of 
labour capacity. Data to the left of the vertical axis 
(negative points relative to the mean) indicate 
lower-than-average spare capacity (and vice versa). 
As the chart highlights, most measures of spare 
capacity point to labour market tightening over 
the year. Whilst some indicators  e.g. the number 
of part-time workers  suggest that there remains 
some capacity that could be called on, capacity 
constraints are clearly beginning to bite.
Most economists believe that the UK is close 
to operating at, or above, capacity. This is 
demonstrated by the near zero output gap  the 
difference between actual and potential output  
forecast by the OBR and others.  (Chart 19)
It is the potential for this to lead to higher inflation, 
coupled with rising indebtedness, that lay behind 
the Bank of Englands decision to increase interest 
rates (and signal a rise to 1% by 2020) (Chart 20)
Chart 17: Capacity utilisation (%) in UK manufacturing sector 
reaches post-financial crisis high 
Source: EuroStat Thomson Reuters Datastream
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Chart 18: Measures of spare capacity in the UK labour market, 
relative to 2002 to 2007 average
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility
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Chart 19: Output gap  actual vs. potential output  is estimated 
to have closed with UK economy near capacity
Source: ONS, LFS 
Chart 20: Projected path for interest rates  first increase since 
financial crisis (but planned increases remain small)
Source: Bank of England
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The UK economic outlook
Operating at close to  or above  capacity would 
normally suggest that the UK economy was in good 
health. 
In contrast, most forecasts predict weak growth 
over the next few years. 
The OBRs forecasts are for growth of just 1.4% 
and 1.3% for 2018 and 2019 respectively. (Chart 
21). Indeed the OBR has wiped off £60bn from 
their UK GDP forecasts for the next 5 years since 
their previous forecast in March. 
Whilst the OBR are slightly more downbeat than 
the Bank of England, most independent forecasters 
share the view that (even assuming a smooth 
Brexit), UK growth will be fragile over the next few 
years. (Table 5)
Weaker growth across the board is predicted with 
consumption particularly constrained relative to 
historical levels in 2018 and 2019. (Chart 22)
The key driver of these downbeat forecasts is the 
UKs much weaker outlook for productivity. 
In recent years, UK productivity growth has been 
much lower than prior to the financial crisis. 
This puzzle was largely seen as a temporary 
phenomenon but the OBR have revised this 
assessment and now believe it to be something 
more long-term. (Chart 23)
Chart 21: Evolution of OBR forecasts over last 12 months
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility
Table 5: UK forecasts for GDP and inflation from major 
independent forecasters
Source: Various
Chart 22: Composition of OBR UK growth forecasts to 2022 
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility 
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Chart 23: Weak UK productivity has been a feature since 2008: 
OBR now expect impact to be long-term
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Huge uncertainty exists over the outlook for 
productivity across advanced economies. Some 
economists are pessimistic, believing that we have 
entered an era of weak productivity growth.  
It is hard however, to reconcile this with the 
opportunities that exist from automation and the 
growth of the digital economy. 
As always, the reality is likely to lie somewhere 
in-between. Legacy effects from the financial 
crisis (e.g. a mis-functioning banking system) and 
a cycle of labour hoarding and weak investment, 
are all still likely to be having some impact and 
should recede over time. 
That being said, it is clear that the UK faces a 
considerable long-term productivity challenge. 
More needs to be done  not just to grow high 
productivity sectors but  to turn around the 
long-tail of less productive firms and sectors that 
make up a large proportion of the UK economy. 
(Chart 24) 
Improving levels of investment, R&D, skills and 
innovation are important. But so is boosting 
business efficiency, like better management and 
process innovation. The Bank of England estimates 
that a third of UK companies have seen no growth 
in productivity this century.  
The UK Autumn Budget
This gloomier outlook has  once again  led 
the OBR to revise up its public sector borrowing 
forecasts. 
Despite this years borrowing being lower than 
expected, the OBR now predict higher borrowing 
across the forecast horizon. (Chart 25)
Even before the measures announced in the Budget, 
the UK Government was expected to borrow over 
£30bn more by 2021-22 than it planned back in 
March. Recall that this comes on the back of an 
additional £100bn of borrowing added this time 
last year. The reason for this failure to make inroads 
in the deficit has been the weak performance of 
tax revenues in recent years. (Chart 26)  
Chart 24: UK productivity by industry (over year 2016/17): 
substantial variation in productivity by industry  long-tail 
Source: ONS, UK productivity series
Chart 25: Revised UK public sector borrowing  with date for end 
of austerity pushed back 
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility, FAI calculations
Chart 26: Fiscal outturns compared to 2010 plans  spending on 
track to meet target but revenues weak 
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility, FAI calculations
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UK public sector net debt is forecast to stabilise at 
around 80% of GDP. (Chart 27)
It is the levels of indebtedness that the Chancellor is 
arguably most interested in both from an economic 
and political perspective. 
Despite UK debt to GDP doubling since the financial 
crisis, the cost of servicing these debt obligations 
has remained broadly constant in real terms. This is 
because although the stock of debt has increased, 
the interest rates on gilts has fallen to near record 
low levels.
But should the outlook for government borrowing 
charges change, either because interest rates rise 
to combat inflation or investors become nervous 
about the UKs prospects outside the EU, then the 
costs of servicing the debt will rise.
The UK Budgets implications for 
Scotland
The UK Budget contained a number of measures 
with implications for Scotland  including further 
tax breaks for the North Sea. 
There were also Barnett consequentials of £2bn 
over the period 2017-18 to 2020-21. £1.6bn  or 
just over 80%  was in the form of capital spending. 
(Chart 28)
Resource spending is expenditure which covers 
day-to-day services on things like pay and resources 
for schools and hospitals. This was boosted by 
around £350m over 2017-18 to 2019-20.
However, the Scottish Governments resource 
block grant remains on track to fall in real terms 
over the course of this parliament. (Chart 29)
This will take spending back to near 2006-07 
levels. It should be noted though that Scotlands 
population has grown since then, making the 
relative squeeze that bit more intense. (Chart 30) 
The outlook for capital spending is more positive. 
(Chart 31)
Chart 27: UK public sector net debt close to 80% of GDP 
Source: Office for Budget Responsibility
Chart 28: Barnett Consequentials for Scottish Budget from 
Autumn Budget: 2017/18 to 2020/21 (cash terms) 
Source: FAI calculations
Chart 29: SG Resource budget to fall (in real terms) by over 
£350m between 2016-17 and 2019-20 - even after series of 
increases in recent budgets
Source: FAI calculations
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Of the £1.6bn capital uplift, the majority of this 
was in financial transactions  of around £1.1bn. 
Financial transactions are becomingly increasingly 
common. Whilst they cannot be used to support 
day-to-day spending or to fund traditional capital 
building programmes, they support new investment 
through the provision of government-backed loans 
and equity to the private sector.
Whilst it is true that financial transactions are 
different to traditional public sector spending, 
if used wisely they are an important instrument 
available to government. Indeed the Scottish 
Government has made extensive use of them in 
the past  e.g. via help to buy initiatives.   
One area the government may find them particularly 
helpful is to consider how they might be used to 
support the creation of the Scottish Governments 
proposed Scottish National Investment Bank. 
Even excluding financial transactions, the Scottish 
Governments traditional capital budget is on 
track to increase 6% in 2018/19. And the Scottish 
Government can now also borrow to support further 
capital investment. Use of these borrowing powers 
in full in 2018/19 could take capital spending 
back to levels not seen since the historic high of 
2010/11. 
Taken altogether, the Scottish Governments total 
block grant (resource and capital but excluding 
financial transactions) is on track to increase by 
around 1% between 2016-17 and 2019-20.   
Recent Scottish Economy Data
The latest figures show growth in the Scottish 
economy of just 0.1% for the 3-months to July. 
The downturn was driven by another sharp fall 
in construction sector activity. In contrast, the 
all-important services sector had relatively robust 
growth. 
Such weak overall results are hugely disappointing. 
(Chart 32)
Chart 30: SG resource block grant since 1999 - taking spending 
back to around 2006-07 levels
Source: FAI calculations
Chart 31: SG capital block grant to 2020-21: outlook more 
positive than resource and soon above 2010-11 levels 
Source: FAI calculations
Chart 32: Scottish GDP growth Q2 2017 by broad sector
Source: Scottish Government, Q2 GDP 
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The results for Q2 came on the back of strong 
growth for the first three months of 2017 (initially 
+0.8% but now revised to +0.6%)
When the Q1 results were first posted in July, this 
led some to argue that the economy was in more 
robust health than we  and others  believed to 
be the case. 
But as we have pointed out, much of the bounce-back 
was driven by temporary factors concentrated in a 
small number of sectors. Just three industries in 
manufacturing  with a combined value of just 6% 
of the Scottish economy  contributed around half 
the net growth during Q1. (Chart 33)
It was a near certainty therefore, that growth would 
slip back in the subsequent quarter.  
As we have said on a number of occasions, it 
is important not to get too carried away with 
one quarters set of results (be they positive or 
negative). 
The Scottish series can be volatile, so focussing 
on longer-term trends is more relevant. And on this 
basis, there is no escaping that Scottish growth 
has been weak. In five of the past six quarters, 
Scottish growth has been just 0.1% or lower and 
GDP per capita has been broadly flat since 2015. 
(Chart 34)
One bright-spot in the most recent quarterly results 
is the strong growth in services  with growth of 
0.7% over the 3-month period to June. 
In most instances, strong growth in services would 
be sufficient to power faster growth given that it 
accounts for 75% of the Scottish economy.
But this was offset by declining activity in the 
construction sector  for the sixth consecutive 
quarter  and activity in the production sector 
slipping back.
As Chart 35 highlights, over the past two years, 
both production and construction have dragged 
down overall growth in the Scottish economy. 
Chart 33: Performance of three sectors (and manufacturing) 
which drove growth in Q1 2017
Source: Scottish Government, Q2 GDP 
Chart 34: Scottish GDP per head vs. UK from 2015 
Source: Scottish Government, Q2 GDP 
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Chart 35: Contribution to growth  last 10, 5 and 2 years  
construction and production lagging but services strong
Source: Scottish Government, Q2 GDP 
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Chart 37: Scottish & UK economic performance: Q1 2007 to Q2 
2017
Source: Scottish Government, Q2 GDP 
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Over the course of the year, the Scottish economy 
has grown 0.5% - around a quarter of trend growth. 
Unfortunately, this is part of an increasingly 
consistent story.
Like many other advanced economies, the Scottish 
economy has been stuck in a cycle of relatively 
weak growth. 
Between 1999 and 2006, reported growth in GDP 
per head averaged 2.3% per annum. After the 
financial crisis of 2007  2009, annual reported 
growth has averaged just 0.8%. (Chart 36)
The Scottish Parliaments Economy, Jobs and Fair 
Work Committee has launched an inquiry into 
Scotlands economic performance since 2007.
On many key indicators, such as productivity, 
participation and economic inequality, limited 
progress has been made in closing the gap with 
the top performing countries. 
For example back in 2007, the Scottish Government 
set a target to close the growth gap with the UK by 
2011. But in the 42 quarters since the start of 2007, 
the annual growth differential between Scotland 
and the UK has only been in Scotlands favour on 
12 occasions. (Chart 37).
The growth gap with the UK over time is narrower 
when looking at GDP per head. Much faster 
population growth at the UK level has been a key 
reason why overall UK growth has been stronger. 
It is possible to examine the key components of 
growth over time. (Table 6)
Taking the latest decade we have full data for  
2006 to 2016  productivity grew at a faster rate in 
Scotland than in the UK as a whole . 
In contrast, for both population and key 
labour market indicators, the UK economy has 
out-performed Scotland. Table 6: Key growth drivers over last decade: average % change
Source: FAI calculations
Chart 36: Annual Scottish GDP per head growth: 1999 to 2016
Source: Scottish Government, Q2 GDP 
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Drivers of growth
With the exception of gross fixed capital formation  
i.e. investment  the core expenditure components 
of GDP increased in cash terms over the second 
quarter of 2017. 
Private consumption was again the main 
contributor  as it has been since 2015. (Chart 38)
Net trade made a positive contribution for the 
second quarter. Whilst this is a modelled series, 
and should be viewed with caution, this appears to 
be driven by two factors. 
Firstly, an improvement in the international trade 
balance. Secondly, activity in Scotland which 
supports the North Sea  i.e. the supply chain such 
as engineering and services for offshore workers 
 is (oddly in our view) counted as a rUK export.
As the downturn has eased so our notional trade
position with rUK has improved. (Chart 39)
Like the UK, consumption growth has eased 
in recent times. This is unsurprising given the 
squeeze on household incomes. 
Consumers have been compensating for weak 
growth in employee income by lowering their 
savings. (Chart 40) The savings ratio has fallen 
further in 2017  from 11% in 2015 to 6.4% now.  
At the same time, the amount of unsecured 
borrowing has increased. (Chart 41)
Chart 38: Expenditure components of GDP since 2015  
households remain most important factor 
Source: Scottish Government, Quarterly National Accounts
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Chart 39: Ongoing challenges with Scottish exports  though 
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Source: Scottish Government, Quarterly National Accounts
Chart 40: Employee income and the savings ratio downturn in 
income coincides with fall in savings
Source: Scottish Government, Quarterly National Accounts
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The fall in capital formation was once again driven 
by weak levels of business investment. 
As Chart 42 highlights, business investment has 
fallen by 14.8% over the year and by nearly 25% 
in two years. 
Note too, that the figures are in current prices (i.e. 
unadjusted for inflation), so in reality the scale of 
the weakness in investment is even starker. 
How does this square with recent statistics which 
showed that the number of businesses in Scotland 
was at a record high? As at March 2017, there were 
an estimated 365,600 private sector enterprises - 
an increase of 3.1% on 2016.  
But 78% of the increase was in unregistered 
businesses, with a further 19% registered but 
having no employees. Unregistered firms tend to 
be small (primarily self-employed).
As Chart 43 highlights this is part of a longer-term 
trend, with a sharp increase in un-registered firms.
It would appear that much of the recent pick-up in 
business activity has not been in more traditional 
forms of business, but in self-employment and 
employees setting themselves up as consultants.
Since 2010 nearly 80% of the net growth in firms 
with 0-49 employees has been in the professional, 
administrative and information sectors  where 
consultancy growth has been high. (Chart 44).
It is also interesting that the vast majority of the 
growth in larger businesses since 2010 (50+ 
employees)  has been in firms owned outwith 
Scotland. (Table 7)
Chart 42: Business investment in Scotland since 2008  very 
little growth even in cash terms 
Source: Scottish Government, Quarterly National Accounts
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Chart 43: Significant growth in new businesses in Scotland 
since 2000  but most are small
Source: Businesses in Scotland, FAI calculations
Chart 44: Growth in small businesses (<50 employees) since 
2010  composition of growth by sector 
Source: Businesses in Scotland, FAI calculations
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Table 7: Sources of business growth by origin: 2010 to 2017
Source: Businesses in Scotland, FAI calculations
Enterprises Jobs
Growth
% of total 
growth
Scottish owned
0-49 + 20,865 99% +53,280
50-249 +40 20% +2,260
250+ +15 14% -3,250
Non-Scottish owned
0-49 +180 1% +2,560
50-249 +165 80% +6,300
250+ +90 86% +21,670
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Performance by Sector
As previously highlighted in Chart 35, there is 
significant variation in sector performance in the 
most recent growth statistics for Scotland.
Within manufacturing, most sectors witnessed a 
decline, although food and drink grew by 1%.  
Construction continued to act as a drag on overall 
growth. Activity was down 3.5% over the quarter 
and 5.5% annually. (Chart 45)
The decline in construction has been driven by a 
sharp fall in infrastructure spending from record 
highs in 2015 (when a series of major public 
projects were being constructed). 
As highlighted above, the one bright spot has been 
the strength of the services sector  which grew 
+0.7% over the quarter and by 1.3% over the year.
With the exception of retail and accommodation 
& food, all major sectors grew over the year, 
with professional services making the greatest 
contribution. (Chart 46)
Such professional-and related services, including 
finance, real estate etc., have grown strongly 
in recent times  outpacing growth in the wider 
economy. (Chart 47)  
Retail sales were flat during the third quarter of 
2017 and grew just 0.6% over the year, providing 
further evidence of weak consumer confidence. 
(Chart 48)
Chart 45: Construction sector in Scotland since 2010 
Source: Scottish Government Q2 2017 Quarterly GDP 
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Chart 46: Contributions to service sector growth over last 12 
months
Source: Scottish Government Q2 2017 Quarterly GDP 
Chart 47: Strong growth in professional and related services 
since 2015
Source: Scottish Government, Q3 Retail Sales Index
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Chart 48: Weak retail sales growth  Q3 2017 
Source: Scottish Government Q2 2017 Quarterly GDP
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The Scottish labour market
The labour market in Scotland continues to provide 
impressive headline indicators  employment is 
75.2% whilst unemployment remains low at 4.0%. 
(Chart 49)
Over the year to September, employment 
has increased by 46,000. At the same time, 
unemployment has fallen by around 20,000.
On both, Scotland is slightly better than the UK  
although as we have indicated, with confidence 
intervals of +/1.3% & +/-0.7%-points surrounding 
these estimates, care needs to be taken when 
interpreting small differences in headline numbers. 
As Chart 50 shows, the recent growth in employment 
has been driven by rising self-employment. This is 
consistent with the trends on business formation 
outlined above.  
Regional variations continue across Scotland. 
Chart 51 shows relative performance by local 
authority between 2008 & 2013 (the peak of 
Scottish unemployment) and 2008 and 2017. 
Local authorities in the top right have been the 
most resilient, with higher employment in both 
2013 & 2017 compared to 2008. Authorities in 
the top left initially saw employment fall between 
2008 and 2013 but have since recovered. Those in 
the bottom left still have employment levels below 
2008 levels. 
Chart 49: Scottish employment & unemployment rate since 
2008  near record levels since LFS began in 1992
Source: ONS, LFS
Chart 50: Scottish employment & self-employment since 2011
Source: ONS, LFS
Chart 51: Local authority employment changes since 2008 
Source: ONS, APS
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Chart 52 shows the evolution of youth employment 
and unemployment. Youth unemployment in 
Scotland is around its record low but the youth 
employment rate remains below its 2007-08 level. 
The latest figures on earnings  which cover the 
period up to March 2017  show that household 
budgets continue to be squeezed. (Chart 53)
With inflation at 3%, real earnings have once again 
turned negative, meaning that workers are seeing 
the purchasing power of their pay eroded. 
As Chart 54 shows, earnings growth has not been 
uniform across incomes. While the fastest income 
growth has been seen among the 10% of the 
labour force with the lowest weekly earnings, this 
earnings growth is still barely above the rate of 
inflation. For all but the bottom 10%, real earnings 
have declined.
Productivity
Strong labour market outcomes are clearly 
welcome. Whilst there are concerns about the 
quality and nature of some of the work created, the 
overall trend has  on the whole  been positive.
That being said, this is only one dimension of the 
wider health of the economy.
With relatively weak economic growth, more people 
in work implies that the average contribution of 
each person to national output is either growing 
very slowly or falling. 
Much has been written recently about the UKs 
(and by implication Scotlands) productivity 
performance. In the long run it is key to boosting 
earnings and growing the tax base.
The latest figures show that productivity in 
Scotland as measured by output per hour (the 
preferred measure) was down 2.2% over the year.
Productivity growth has now been negative for 
seven consecutive quarters. (Chart 55)
As with Scottish GDP data, one reason for this is 
the downturn in oil and gas spilling over onto the 
onshore economy. 
Chart 52: Youth (16 -24) employment and unemployment since 
2007-08
Source: ONS, LFS
Chart 53: Median real earnings in Scotland and UK CPI inflation 
since 2003
Source: ONS, ASHE
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Chart 54: Nominal earnings growth median, mean and by decile, 
Scotland, 2016-2017 
Source: ONS, ASHE
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This is a concern as many of the sectors in the North 
Sea supply chain  e.g. in advanced engineering  
are highly productive.
Scotland had been catching up with the UK (until 
2015). (Chart 56)
Much of this catch-up appears to have not come 
from strong Scottish-specific productivity per se 
but because the UK has created jobs at a much 
faster rate and hence softening productivity 
growth. Why does this have an impact on 
productivity measures? 
Productivity is the ratio of output to labour input. If 
the number of people working is increasing faster 
than the growth in output (either due to population 
growth or higher participation), the contribution 
of each worker (or hour worked) will fall. Hence, a 
country creating fewer jobs, could see its relative 
productivity improve.
Chart 57 shows productivity on the basis that 
Scotland had matched the growth in UK jobs and 
hours worked since 2007  and compares this to 
the actual output per job/per hour Scottish series.
As can be seen, had Scotland matched UK growth 
in jobs (Scottish OPJ (UK)) or hours worked 
(Scottish OPH (UK))  for the same level of output 
growth, Scottish productivity would have been 
much weaker. 
Therefore, whether or not the form of catching-up 
that we have seen with UK productivity is a good 
thing is open to debate. 
At least in the short-run, there can sometimes be a 
trade-off between greater productivity and better 
labour market outcomes (i.e. more jobs). 
However you choose to view it, one thing that is 
clear is the importance of looking beyond the 
headline employment indicators to think about 
wider labour market issues like productivity, 
earnings and job quality.
Chart 55: Scottish productivity performance (output per hour) 
since 2015
Source: Scottish Government Productivity Statistics 
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Chart 56: Scottish vs. UK productivity (output per hour & output 
per job): 1998 to 2015
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Chart 57: Scottish productivity growth under alternative growth 
scenarios for hours and jobs
Source: Scottish Government Productivity Statistics 
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Current economic conditions
The emerging economic data over the autumn has 
been  in the main  relatively positive. 
The FAI-RBS Business Monitor for Q3 2017 showed 
a slight increase in the net balance of firms 
reporting new business but a slight easing (albeit 
still positive) in repeat business. (Chart 58) 
The gap between the Scottish Purchasing 
Managers Index (PMI) and the equivalent for the 
UK had been narrowing a little in recent months. 
But Novembers PMI for Scotland fell to just 50.2 - 
the lowest value since March. (Chart 59).  
As highlighted previously in Chart 42, low levels 
of business investment has been an unwelcome 
feature of recent times and shows little sign of 
changing. 
The latest Scottish Business Monitor reports that 
more businesses are planning on cutting back 
investment over the next six months than there are 
planning to increase it. And this is despite turnover 
prospects improving. (Chart 60).
A similar result is found in the latest Scottish 
Chambers of Commerce survey. (Chart 61). Here 
the percentage of firms engaging in investment 
has tended to have been lower in both 2017 and 
2016 than in 2015. Unsurprisingly, the tourism 
sector  on the back of a strong 2016 and 2017 is 
more positive.
Chart 58: Scottish Business Monitor Q3 2017  fragile but still 
positive growth
Source: Fraser of Allander/RBS Scottish Business Monitor
Chart 59: PMI for different parts of the UK: Scotland lagging the 
UK 
Source: IHS Markit 
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Chart 60: Business investment intentions (and turnover) 
according to latest Scottish Business Monitor
Source: Fraser of Allander/RBS Scottish Business Monitor 
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Chart 61: Business investment intentions according to Scottish 
Chambers of Commerce*
Source: Scottish Chambers of Commerce/FAI 
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Levels of consumer confidence remain weak. The 
GfK consumer confidence indicator for Scotland 
declined further in November to its lowest level in 
2 years  and is now well below the UK (Chart 62). 
A similar story emerges in the Scottish 
Governments consumer sentiment measure. 
In this, Scottish households are asked of their 
expectations for the next 12 months for both 
the economy and household finances. Their 
expectations for the economy remain negative 
 and are at their lowest since the series began
in 2013. Their perception of the outlook for 
household finances has also weakened. (Chart 
63)
Overall, households at the lower end of the income 
distribution appear to be less confident about 
the future than better off households. The GfK 
indicator of consumer confidence has typically 
been more negative for those earning less than 
£25,000 for the past two years. (Chart 64)
Whilst households appear pessimistic about the 
outlook, the demand for labour remains strong. 
(Chart 65) The Bank of Scotlands labour market 
barometer  which captures various measures 
of activity in the Scottish jobs market such as 
demand for new staff etc.  continues to perform 
well-above its long-term average. 
This suggests that the disconnect between a 
resilient labour market and a weaker economic 
outlook is likely to continue for some time yet.
Chart 62: Consumer confidence in Scotland   becoming more 
negative 
Source: GfK
Chart 63: Scottish Government indicator of household 
sentiment on economy/household finances also declining 
Source: Scottish Government
Chart 64: Confidence negative across income bands pessimism 
highest amongst low earners
Source: GfK
Chart 65: Bank of Scotland employment indicator  continues to 
show robust labour market demand
Source: IHS Markit/Bank of Scotland
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As in the past, we report a central forecast but also 
uncertainty bands that set out a likely range within 
which we predict Scottish economic growth will lie. 
This December issue includes our first estimates of 
growth for 2020. 
We have revised down slightly our forecasts for 
2018 and 2019 in the light of a weaker UK outlook 
and a failure of investment or consumer confidence 
to pick-up in Scotland. 
However, our overall assessment is broadly 
unchanged. We believe that the Scottish economy 
will grow next year and the year after, but predict 
that such growth will remain below trend. 
Our revised forecast is for growth of 1.2% in 2018, 
1.4% in 2019 and 1.4% in 2020. (Table 8, Chart 66)
Our last forecast for 2017 of 1.2% growth  made 
in September  is on track to be slightly over 
optimistic based upon the latest figures published 
for this year thus far. 
Our nowcasts suggests growth of around 0.38% 
and 0.35% for Q3 and Q4 in 2017 (Table 9). 
The combination of these nowcasts alongside the 
revision to Q1 data (from 0.8% to 0.6%) and the 
weak growth of 0.1% in Q2, means that annual 
growth for 2017 is currently heading to be 0.8% on 
a 4Q-on-4Q basis (and 1.4% comparing the final 
quarter of 2017 with the same period in 2016). 
Should this occur, this will take Scotlands 
average growth rate over the past decade to just 
0.7%. It cannot be overemphasised how deeply 
disappointing this is. The fact that this poor 
performance is not the focus of more attention 
remains hugely surprising. 
The scale of our revisions for 2018 and 2019 are 
-0.16 and -0.30 percentage points respectively
(Table 10).
As in recent years, services should make the 
greatest contribution to overall growth, however in 
absolute terms, growth in production is forecast to 
be slightly higher. (Chart 67)
Table 8: FAI forecast Scottish Economic growth (%) 2018 to 
2020
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Table 9: Nowcasts for Q3 2017 and Q4 2017 for Scotland
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Chart 66: Growth to remain below trend through forecast
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Table 10: FAI revised forecast %-point change from September 
2017 forecast by sector, 2018 to 2019
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
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Forecasts
2018 2019 2020
GVA 1.2 1.4 1.4
Production 1.4 1.6 1.2
Construction 0.7 0.9 0.5
Services 1.2 1.4 1.5
Q3 Q4
Quarterly Growth +0.38 +0.35
Annualised Growth +1.51 +1.4
2018 2019
GVA -0.16 -0.30
Production -0.11 -0.25
Construction -0.11 -0.21
Services -0.16 -0.31
* Actual data to Q2 2017, central forecast with forecast uncertainty for 
2018  2020. Uncertainty bands sourced from accuracy of past forecasts 
at different forecast horizons
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Weak earnings will mean that household spending 
 and the industries it supports (e.g. retail)  will
continue to be under pressure well into 2018. 
However building on recent growth, professional 
and business services are placed to do better. 
Tourist facing businesses have had a strong 2017 
and this should continue (particularly if Sterling 
stays competitive). 
We expect the outlook for manufacturing to be 
slightly more positive, particularly as optimism in 
the North Sea supply chain continues to improve.
The construction sector should start to see more 
positive growth over the next couple of years. 
The increase in investment announced by the UK 
Government should help reverse recent falls in 
infrastructure spending. 
The greatest drag on growth is likely to be weak 
business investment as Brexit uncertainty 
continues to put-off firms from expanding. 
Our latest forecasts for Scotland put us slightly 
behind the Bank of Englands forecast for the UK 
economy but ahead of the OBRs UK forecast. 
Whilst we do not forecast the UK economy directly, 
on balance, we believe that Scotland will do well 
to match forecasted UK growth over the next few 
years. (Table 11)
There are a number of reasons for this. 
Firstly, the downturn in oil and gas is clearly a 
structural rather than cyclical challenge. Going 
forward investment, wages and supply-chain 
activity will undoubtedly be smaller than in the 
past. 
Secondly, Scotlands 16-64 population is 
projected to grow more slowly (and then decline). 
This is in contrast to the UK as a whole. (Chart 68) 
Note however, to the extent that the pension age 
continues to rise, this will initially dampen any 
effect of population ageing in Scotland. 
Thirdly, there is little evidence to suggest that 
Scotland will significantly outperform the UK in 
terms of productivity over the next few years. 
Table 11: Forecast UK GDP growth (%) 2018 to 2020 
Source: HM Treasury
Chart 67: Sector components of FAI growth forecasts for 2018 to 
2020
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
Chart 68: Projections for working age population: Scotland vs. 
UK (different scenarios for pension age)
Source: ONS population projections
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Indeed given recent trends, and the downturn in 
one of Scotlands most productive sectors  the oil 
and gas supply chain  the outlook for Scotland 
could be weaker.  
Clearly there remains much uncertainty over such 
forecasts, but our expectation is that productivity 
will start to pick-up in the coming years (albeit it will 
continue to remain poor by historical standards).  
Chart 69 shows alternative productivity forecasts 
under two different scenarios. A low scenario 
assumes that productivity performs broadly as it 
has done since 2008. The high scenario assumes 
that productivity returns to 2% growth by 2020.  
In the low productivity case, growth remains 
weak and stuck below 1% over the forecast horizon 
 growing just 0.5% in 2018 and 0.9% in 2019 and
2020. In the high productivity scenario, whilst 
growth remains below trend it starts to pick-up and 
approaches 2.1% by 2020. (Chart 70)
Faced with this outlook, and a decade of growth 
less than 1% a year, it is vital that the Scottish 
Government use the Budget to come forward with 
clear practical policy actions to support business, 
attract investment and boost productivity. 
Strategies, action plans and ambitions around 
inclusive growth will only take us so far. 
The Scottish Fiscal Commission (SFC) will publish 
its first economic and fiscal forecasts alongside 
the Scottish Budget. A number of points are worth 
noting. 
Based on recent evidence we see no reason to 
think that they will be anything but cautious in 
their assessment of the Scottish economy.  
Furthermore, weak GDP forecasts will undoubtedly 
have an impact on expected Scottish revenues 
(prior to any policy decisions). 
But as David Eisers article in this Commentary 
points out, changes in aggregate measures of 
economic performance (such as GDP), at least in 
the short-run, might not be perfectly correlated 
with changes in tax revenues.
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
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Chart 69: Forecasts for productivity growth: different scenarios
Chart 70: Growth forecasts under different outlooks for 
productivity (central, high productivity, low productivity)
Chart 71: Annual earnings growth: Scotland vs. the UK since 
2003
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For example for income tax, what matters most is 
the outlook for wages and employment. 
And here there are reasons to be slightly more 
optimistic on Scotlands relative performance (at 
least in the short-term). 
On earnings, whilst weak Scottish incomes have 
tended to keep pace with those in the UK as a 
whole.  (Chart 71). A similar picture emerges in 
terms of labour market indicators. Our latest 
forecast is for Scottish unemployment to broadly 
track that of the UK. (Table 12)
Of course, should Scotlands economy grow more 
slowly than the UK over time, then the potential 
risks to devolved budgets are more serious. Even 
small percentage point differences in tax revenues 
amount to hundreds of millions of pounds in lost 
revenues, even over a short number of years. 
This is why we believe that this Budget should be 
judged for what it says about the economy just as 
much as it will about Scottish taxation and spend. 
Table 12: FAI labour market forecast to 2020 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute
2018 2019 2020
Employee jobs 2,462,900 2,488,850 2,526,500
% employee job 
growth over year
+0.9% +1.1% +1.5%
ILO unemployment 120,350 114,650 116,300
Bank of England - UK 4.3% 4.4% 4.6%
OBR - UK 4.2% 4.2% 4.3%
Rate (%)1 4.5 4.2 4.2
Notes: 
Absolute numbers are rounded to the nearest 50. 
1. Rate calculated as total ILO unemployment divided by total of 
economically active population aged 16 and over.
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Policy Context
The Cabinet Secretary for Finance, Derek Mackay, 
will publish the Scottish Budget on 14th December. 
As we set out in our Scotlands Budget: 2017 report 
in September, this will be a tough settlement. 
After a small increase in 2017/18, the Scottish 
resource block grant will fall by just under 1% in 
real terms next year. This will bring the cumulative 
real terms fall in the block grant since 2010/11 to 
almost 7%.
At the same time, the budget comes at a time 
of heightened economic uncertainty and weak 
growth. 
Meeting spending demands whilst maintaining 
economic competitiveness requires a careful 
balance.  
It is also worth remembering that Mr Mackay is 
required to gain the support of one or more party 
in the Scottish Parliament. 
So what are the key policy issues to look for?
The governments spending priorities
Since 1999, successive administrations have 
chosen to prioritise health spending. In this 
parliamentary term, the Scottish Government has 
committed to increase spending on health by £500 
million more than inflation. 
This might sound generous but it is likely to be 
sufficient just to keep up with population and 
demographic trends.
The government hopes that savings can be made 
by moving to more preventative and joined-up 
models of service provision - for example, in 
health and social care. But wider reforms continue 
to prove difficult to implement and, even then, will 
only deliver savings in the long-term. 
With health protected, other areas of the budget 
are required to pick-up the burden. 
Non-health spending has declined by 10% in real 
terms since 2010/11. But the population has also 
been growing. As a result, in per capita terms, 
non-health spending has declined by 13%, and is 
on course to fall by almost a fifth by the end of the 
decade.
A consequence of the increasing prevalence of 
one-year (as opposed to multi-year) budgets is 
that the scale of these changes over time  and 
the relative shift of spending priorities  has gone 
relatively unnoticed.
In looking to this weeks budget and beyond, there 
are some additional areas that are also likely to be 
protected. 
This includes commitments to protect police 
spending, expand childcare, and tackle 
inequalities in educational attainment. On top of 
this, the government has a number of politically 
symbolic policies to deliver (like free prescriptions, 
free university tuition, concessionary travel etc.); 
a pay rise for public sector workers; borrowing 
commitments (of around £1 billion); and a new 
social security agency to establish. 
Non-protected areas are therefore in line for a 
challenging budget settlement. 
Protecting some services over others is part of 
the job of government, but there is also a need for 
strategic choices within unprotected areas. 
Tax increases cannot free policymakers 
IURPPDNLQJGLőFXOWFKRLFHV
The pressures on spending means that the 
government has been quite open about its 
aspirations to raise revenues through income tax.
The government has advocated the concept of a 
social contract, i.e. access to a range of publicly 
provided services, including various flagship 
universal services, funded by higher taxation. 
But a policy to increase tax rates clearly carries 
risks, both politically and economically. 
Even a relatively bold policy on income tax (e.g. 
one that adds a penny to all tax rates but protects 
those earning below the national median income) 
is likely to raise not much more than £300 million. 
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This could help to offset this years budget cut. 
However, with consolidation of funding from 
Westminster likely to continue into the next 
decade, it will only be a short-term fix. 
Of course any proposals to increase tax rates will 
generate a debate about the potential effects on 
incentives to work, business competitiveness and 
Scotlands attractiveness as a place for investment. 
In reality, little is known with certainty about the 
potential economic impacts of changing tax rates 
within the context of devolution. In the short 
run, much will depend upon the aggregate net 
impact of reduced household incomes but higher 
government spending.  
But over the long run, of greater concern to the 
government could be the impact of higher taxes 
on business sentiment and Scotlands perceived 
competiveness relative to the rest of the UK. 
If there is one area where the government may be 
more likely to consider tax cuts, it is in relation 
to Land and Buildings Transaction Tax. There had 
been calls to align LBTT rates closer to those in 
England (properties in Scotland pay higher tax 
on transactions over £333,000). It may also face 
pressure to mimic the UK Governments Stamp 
Duty tax cut for first time buyers. 
The risk is that, with the price structure of housing 
significantly different in Scotland compared to 
England, replicating the English structure will 
imply much reduced revenues and would  impose 
a system of rates less relevant to the Scottish 
market. In the longer term, most economists would 
argue that a more fundamental restructuring of 
land and property taxation, encompassing not 
just LBTT but also business rates and council tax, 
makes more sense. 
Ironically the delay to the devolution of Air 
Passenger Duty (scheduled for 2018) may alleviate 
some immediate budget pressures, given the 
Scottish Governments commitment to reduce 
rates.
The importance of growth
The economic backdrop to the Budget will be 
shaped by the first ever forecasts from the Scottish 
Fiscal Commission (SFC) for both the Scottish 
economy and devolved revenues. It is likely that 
the SFC will be downbeat about the immediate 
prospects for both. 
The fragile economy is of course a significant issue 
for the public finances.  A faster growing economy 
generates larger revenues, while a weaker one 
generates less. 
But whilst it is harder in practice for government 
to stimulate the economy than is often supposed, 
both the Scottish and UK governments are certainly 
not powerless to support growth over the medium 
term. 
With disappointing economic data for two years 
now, the Scottish Government will need to 
articulate how it will support the economy. So 
where can the budget make a difference?
Taxation: One area that businesses will look for 
clarity is over the governments long term vision 
for taxation. If taxes rise, businesses will demand 
a convincing equivalent to the social contract: 
i.e. demonstrable improvements in skills, digital 
connectivity and infrastructure. Action plans and 
strategies will not be sufficient.
Spending priorities: The First Minister has said 
that the government is willing to look at how to 
make the most of the money we already spend 
on supporting the economy  around £2bn per 
annum. That is a significant amount of money  
but does it have an equivalent impact? Enhancing 
the quality of further and higher education, 
supporting enterprise and skills, boosting R&D 
and innovation, delivering a workable National 
Investment Bank are just some of the areas where 
concrete action could make a difference.
Capital investment and borrowing: As a result of UK 
Government decisions, the Scottish Governments 
capital budget is to increase over the next few 
years. Combined with new borrowing powers, 
investment could return to levels not seen since 
2010/11. In the current economic climate, there 
is a case for utilising the borrowing powers in full, 
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but where and how effectively the money is spent 
is just as important.
Financial Transactions: At the same time, 
the government now has £1bn of Financial 
Transactions at its disposal. In theory these could 
be used to lend to businesses  on generous 
terms  to support investment in anything from 
commercial property to R&D. Many would argue 
that investment in these sorts of projects has the 
potential to generate a greater economic return 
than if it were simply used to support borrowing 
for the residential property market. 
The importance of a longer term 
perspective
The major budgetary and wider policy challenges 
that Scotland faces cannot be addressed on 
a year-by-year basis. Implicitly policymakers 
recognise this.
They are increasingly adopting longer-term targets 
for policy interventions (the latest is the target to 
eliminate child poverty by 2030, now enshrined in 
the Child Poverty (Scotland) Bill).
But despite this recognition of the importance of 
a longer-term vision, budget planning remains 
remarkably short-sighted. Unfortunately, another 
one year budget is likely - at best a two year budget 
- following single year budgets in 2016/17 and
2017/18.
The short-term perspective means we lose sight 
both of where we are coming from, but also how 
long-term challenges can best be addressed.
Part of this reflects the political reality of a minority 
government. But this cannot be used as an excuse 
to avoid taking a more strategic approach to the 
Budget. 
Conclusions
In September we discussed how the Scottish 
Government had set out a new vision for supporting 
growth and its willingness to change the emphasis 
of its approach to economic policy. 
The Budget offers the first test of the level of the 
governments ambition.
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Economic Perspectives 
What might slower economic growth in Scotland mean for 
6FRWODQGöVLQFRPHWD[UHYHQXHV" 
David Eiser 
Fraser of Allander Institute 
Abstract 
Income tax revenues now account for over 40% of the Scottish resource budget. Under 
6FRWODQGöV)LVFDO)UDPHZRUNWKH6FRWWLVKEXGJHWEHQHILWVIURPJURZWKLQLQFRPHWD[revenues 
per capita if they grow faster than the growth in equivalent revenues in the rest of the UK (rUK). 
6LQFHWKHEHJLQQLQJRI6FRWODQGöVGross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita has grown 
VLJQLILFDQWO\VORZHUWKDQWKH8.öVUDLVLQJFRQFHUQVWKDWif this trend continues it may lead to 
relatively slower growth in the Scottish income tax base and a weaker outlook for the Scottish 
budget. This paper considers the relationship between GDP per capita and income tax 
revenues. It argues that, whilst there is a reasonably strong relationship between growth in 
GDP per capita and tax revenues in the longer-term, the relationship is likely to be significantly 
weaker in the short-term. Empirically, it finds that whilst Scottish and UK GDP per capita has 
broadly grown at similar rates between 1999 and 2015, growth in income tax revenues per 
capita KDYHDWWLPHVGLYHUJHG7KHSDSHUFRQFOXGHVE\FRQVLGHULQJZKHWKHU6FRWODQGöVUHFHQW
slower growth in GDP per capita is likely to continue over the next few years, and, if it does, 
ZKDWWKLVPLJKWPHDQIRU6FRWODQGöVLQFRPHWD[UHYHQXHV 
Key words: Tax revenues, GDP growth and tax, per capita tax, Scottish Fiscal Framework 
1. Introduction
The recent slowdown LQ6FRWODQGöVUDWHRIHFRQRPLFJURZWKper head relative to the UK has 
been well documented. Whilst growth in UK GDP per head has been weak, growing at just 2.3% 
between Q1 2015 and Q2 2017, Scottish growth has been weaker still, with per capita GDP 
growing at a quarter of that of the UK at just 0.57%, over the same period (Chart 1).  
Revenues from non-savings, non-dividend (NSND) income tax now form part of the Scottish 
budget. Under the Fiscal Framework, the Scottish budget will be better off than it would have 
been without tax devolution, if revenues per capita grow more quickly in Scotland than they do 
in the rest of the UK (rUK). Conversely, a slower growth in revenues per capita in Scotland than 
rUK will translate into a smaller Scottish budget. 
A critical question to consider therefore is what slower growth in GDP per capita ó in Scotland 
relative to rUK ó might mean for the growth of income tax revenues per capita in Scotland 
relative to rUK. Does slower growth in GDP per capita necessarily mean slower growth in 
income tax revenues? How strong is the relationship and what factors might influence it? 
Chart 1: GDP per capita (Q1 2015 = 100) 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
This paper considers the nature of the relationship between growth in GDP per capita and 
income tax revenues. It is structured as follows. Section 2 considers how GDP per capita and 
income tax revenues per capita are correlated in theory, in both the longer and shorter terms. 
In Section 3 we consider the empirical relationship between Scottish income tax revenues 
relative to rUK revenues, and Scottish GDP per capita growth relative to UK GDP growth since 
1999, and consider what factors may have influenced this empirical relationship. Section 4 
concludes by considering the outlook for GDP and income tax revenue growth in Scotland in 
the coming years. 
2. The relationship between GDP per capita and income tax revenues
What is the relationship between growth in GDP per capita and growth in per capita income tax 
revenues? 
It is important to note initially that income tax revenues are a function of the tax base (the 
amount of taxable income), and income tax policy (allowances, rates and bands). So the first 
question to consider is the relationship between GDP and the tax base. 
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Clearly, increases in population will tend to increase both the size of economy (GDP) and the 
tax base (taxable income). To abstract from this relationship, in the rest of this section we will 
assume that population is constant. How then might changes in GDP (i.e. GDP per capita) 
effect the tax base? 
It is important to distinguish between the long-run and the short-run relationship between GDP 
and the tax base. 
Relationship between GDP and the income tax base in the long-run 
Theory (and basic intuition) suggests that there must be a reasonably strong relationship 
between GDP per capita and the income tax base in the long-run. 
GDP is determined by the hours worked and output per hour, i.e. productivity. GDP will 
increase if more work is done (which could be because workers work more hours, or because a 
larger proportion of the population enters work), or if workers become more productive. 
What about the income tax base? This will grow if there is an increase in hours worked, or in 
hourly wages. In the long-run, the only way in which average real wages can grow is through 
increases in productivity: productivity improvements are what enable firms to pay higher 
wages without increasing prices (Box 1). 
This link between productivity and real wages means that the two things that underpin 
increasing GDP per capita ó hours worked and/or higher productivity ó are the same two 
factors that can increase the size of the income tax base ó hours worked and wages. 
Indeed, this is why the two main determinants of income tax revenues in the Scottish Fiscal 
&RPPLVVLRQöVIRUHFDVWVDUHWKHHPSOR\PHQWUDWHDQGWKHDYHUDJHZDJH$QGWKLVLVZK\recent 
downward revisions to productivity growth by the Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) have 
had such devastating effects on tax forecasts at the UK level. 
But even in the long-run, the relationship between growth in GDP per capita and growth in the 
income tax base is unlikely to be absolutely fixed nor be constant over time (i.e. a 1% increase 
in GDP per capita is unlikely to lead to an automatic 1% increase in the tax base over 
prolonged periods). This is partly because the composition of GDP growth can effect average 
incomes and the way in which they are distributed. For example: 
 There might be changes over time in the share of labour as opposed to capital in GDP
growth. In most OECD countries, the share of labour (wages and incomes) relative to
capital (profits and dividends) in GDP has tended to fall in recent decades. In the UK,
the labour share of national income has fallen by around six percentage points
between 1970 - 2014 (OECD, 2015). In practical terms, this is one reason why growth
of GDP might not precisely match the growth of the income tax base in the long run. The
reasons for a falling labour share are debated, but is thought to be at least in part due
to technological change1DQGSHUKDSVDOVREHFDXVHRIDZHDNHQLQJRIODERXUöV
bargaining power (e.g. associated with the decline in trade union membership).
1 õ1HZWHFKQRORJ\öFRPSDQLHVOLNH*RRJOHRU$SSOHKDYHODUJHFDSLWDOLVDWLRQYDOXHVEXWHPSOR\UHODWLYHO\IHZSHRSOH
and have correspondingly lower wage bills.  
 The distribution of income across those in employment can interact with the tax system
to influence the relationship between aggregate earnings and the tax base. With a
progressive tax system lLNHWKH8.öVZDJHJURZWKWKDWLVGLVSURSRUWLRQDWHO\
concentrated on those with higher incomes might strengthen the link between wages
and the income tax base, whereas wage growth that is disproportionately focussed on
the poor might weaken this relationship.
 Similarly, changes in the composition of employment between self-employment and
employees might influence the relationship between economic activity and the tax
base, if self-employment is taxed differently from employment2.
The relationship between productivity and wages might also weaken over time if non-wage 
benefits become more important relative to wage benefits. For example, increased employer 
contributions to pensions or to healthcare plans or perks such as company cars might weaken 
the link between GDP per capita growth and contemporaneous income tax revenues. 
Remember too that the income tax base depends not just on the wages and incomes of those 
in work. Income from State and Occupational pensions and income from some social security 
benefits is liable to income tax. There is likely to be some kind of relationship between GDP per 
capita and pension incomes, although this is likely to be fairly weak or at least be subject to 
long lags (as occupational pension incomes depend partly on lifetime contributions which are 
themselves a function of lifetime income ó together of course with policy and individual 
savings decisions).   
Box 1: How does productivity effect economy-wide wages? 
At one level, productivity is a straightforward concept: it is simply Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) divided by hours worked. In the context of a manufacturing firm, productivity can be 
thought of in relation to the number of widgets produced per hour. It is simple enough to 
imagine how productivity might improve with new technologies or expertise, and it is 
intuitive that higher productivity will enable the firm to pay higher wages without increasing 
its prices. But productivity is an abstruse concept in relation to many economic sectors. How 
should we interpret productivity in the context of a services firm, whether a management 
consultancy or a hairdressers? What about the public sector? How realistic is it for these 
sectors to be more productive? But if it is difficult to improve productivity in certain sectors 
(there must be limits to the number of patients a GP can see per hour, or the number of 
haircuts a barber can give), does this mean that wages in these sectors will stagnate relative 
to the sectors in which it is relatively easy to improve productivity? In the long-run, the 
answer is no. Whilst new technologies or management practices will inevitably enhance 
productivity more in some sectors than in others, short-term wage increases in one sector 
should induce changes in the supply of labour to that sector in the longer run, equalising 
wages. This is why it is average productivity growth that is important in determining average 
wage growth over the longer term, and not simply ZKHWKHUWKHUHLVHYLGHQFHRIõIDVWö
productivity growth in any particular sectors or among particular firms.  
2 In the UK tax system, a self-employed person is liable for slightly higher income tax liabilities than an employee 
with the same income. This is because the self-employed person pays a lower rate of National Insurance 
Contributions, and thus their income after NICs (which is used as the basis of the income tax calculation) is actually 
somewhat higheUWKDQDQHPSOR\HHöV 
 Fraser of Allander Institute
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Relationship between GDP and the income tax base in the short-run 
In the short run however, the relationship between GDP per capita and the income tax base is 
likely to be weaker, for a number of reasons: 
 There can be lags between changes in output (GDP) on the one hand and changes in
employment and/or wages on the other)LUPVPLJKWõKRDUGöODERXUIRUH[DPSOHGXULQJ
an economic downturn (i.e. retain its workforce despite a slowdown in activity, in order
to avoid needing to re-recruit in the upturn), and allow profits to fall instead. During an
upswing, firms might be able to return hoarded labour to more productive uses,
expanding output without needing proportionate increases in labour.
 As already mentioned, some factors determining the income tax base are not really
affected by GDP in the short run. For example, pension income (which accounts for over
10% of Scottish income tax revenues) from year to year is not correlated with GDP in
the short run (but in the long run of course, pension income is in large part a function of
earnings during working life).
 Some taxpayers have the ability to bring forward or delay income and tax liabilities ó
weakening the temporal link between when economic activity takes place and when it
is taxed.
The role of tax policy 
When considering the empirical relationship between growth in GDP per capita and income tax 
revenues there is a further complication which may muddy the picture: changes to income tax 
policy. 
An increase in the size of the tax base might not feed through to an increase in tax revenues if 
it coincides with a reduction in the burden of tax. For example, an increase in wages (and 
corresponding increase in the tax base) might be offset by a proportionately larger increase in 
the Personal Allowance. 
Tax policy changes can thus weaken the relationship between the tax base and tax revenues 
HYHQLIWKLVGRHVQöWZHDNHQWKHrelationship between economic output and the income tax 
base). 
A note on the geographical level at which GDP and the income tax base are measured in 
Scotland 
A further complication that may weaken the relationship between growth in GDP per capita and 
growth of the income tax base is that the geographical level at which these things is measured 
is not consistent. 
This is particularly the case in the Scottish context. When we talk about Scottish GDP we are 
XVXDOO\WDONLQJDERXWõRQVKRUH*'3öLHZHH[FOXGHDFWLYLW\JHQHUDWHGE\WKHRIIVKRUHoil and 
gas sector in the North Sea etc. But it is quite possible that individualsö ZRUNLQJõRIIVKRUHö
count as Scottish taxpayers for the purposes of determining Scottish income tax revenues.  
More significantly, people whose main residence is in Scotland but who work partly or wholly 
LQDQRWKHUSDUWRIWKH8.GRQöWGLUHFWO\FRQWULEXWHWR6FRWWLVKHFRQRPLFRXWSXWEXWWKHLQFRPH
generated from this activity will form part of the Scottish income tax base (and vice versa). In 
theory therefore, a weakening Scottish economy might not generate a weaker tax base if 
Scottish residents commute to England to work. 
3. The empirical relationship between GDP per capita and income tax
revenues per capita in Scotland and UK since 1999
Empirically, how have Scottish GDP per capita and Scottish tax revenues trended over time 
relative to UK revenues and GDP?  
Remember that when it comes to the Scottish Fiscal Framework, what matters for the Scottish 
budget is how Scottish income tax revenues (per capita) grow relative to rUK income tax 
revenues (per capita). If Scottish revenues per capita grow more quickly than the equivalent 
rUK revenues per capita, the Scottish budget will be better off than it would have been without 
tax devolution. 
It is therefore instructive to consider trends in GDP per capita in Scotland compared to the UK, 
and to see whether this trend sheds any light on the growth in Scottish income tax revenues 
(per capita) relative to those in the UK3. 
Scottish GDP per capita growth has largely tracked UK per capita growth since 1999 (Chart 2). 
Scotland experienced a marginally shallower recession, but more recently there is emerging 
evidence of a de-coupling of Scottish and UK GDP per capita growth, which was alluded to at 
the start of this article. 
Chart 2: GDP per capita (Q1 1999 = 100) 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
3 In this empirical analysis we compare Scotland with the UK as a whole. Under the Fiscal Framework however, what 
matters is how Scotland compares with the rest of the UK (rUK). 
 Fraser of Allander Institute
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Are these trends in relative GDP per capita growth reflected in trends in relative per capita 
income tax revenues? To answer this, it is useful to distinguish two periods. 
1999-2007 
Scottish income tax revenues per capita converged towards that of the UK between 2000 and 
2007, but have since remained around 12% lower than in the UK (Chart 3). 
:K\GLG6FRWODQGöVWD[UHYHQXHVSHUFDSLWDLQFUHDVHUHODWLYHWRWKH8.öVbetween 2000 and 
2007? Two things happened: 
 )LUVW6FRWODQGöVHPSOR\PHQWUDWHrose and closed the gap to, and then surpassed, the
UK rate (Chart 4).
 Second, average4 Scottish wages have converged somewhat to UK wages since 1999
(Chart 5).
So Scottish income tax revenues per capita converged to those of UK between 2000 and 2007, 
reflecting relatively faster wage and employment growth in Scotland. But as we have seen, GDP 
per capita essentially grew at the same rate as in the UK.  
Chart 3: Income tax revenues per capita, Scotland relative to UK=1 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
4 Average earnings are a better indicator of changes in the tax base than median earnings (although median 
earnings give a better indication of living standards for the typical worker). 
Chart 4: Scotland and UK employment rate (16+, seasonally adjusted) 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Chart 5: Scotland average weekly wage as a percentage of UK, all workers 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Why might it be the case that Scottish employment and wages (and thus relative tax revenues) 
converged towards UK even when GDP per capita was not converging? The answer to this is, it 
is not entirely clear.  
 Fraser of Allander Institute
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 6FRWWLVK*'3LVPHDVXUHGRQWKHEDVLVRIõRQVKRUHöDFWLYLW\DQGWKXVõRIIVKRUHö
economic activity is excluded from the measure of Scottish output. But those working
LQWKHRIIVKRUHVHFWRUZLOOFRXQWDVõ6FRWWLVKöLQUHJLonal earnings statistics. So it is
possible that increased employment in the (relatively high paying) offshore sector
contributed to wage convergence that was not matched by faster growth in Scottish
onshore output. However, on its own this seems an unlikely explanation to explain why
Scottish GDP per capita did not converge to the UK, even whilst the income tax base
did.
 Similarly it also seems unlikely that (marginally) higher rates of population ageing in
Scotland (which might depress GDP per capita growth for a given increase in wages)
can on their own explain this trend.
2007 ó 2015 
In the period since 2007, the Scottish employment rate has (broadly) tracked the UK 
employment rate, whilst wages have continued to converge somewhat.  
But if Scottish and UK wages have converged since 2007, why have revenues per capita not 
converged? One potential explanation relates to the effects of (UK-wide) income tax policy 
implemented since 2007.  
Two key changes are worth noting. Since 2007/8 the Personal Allowance has increased 
significantly in real terms. Alongside the real terms increase in the Personal Allowance, tax 
rates on the highest earners have increased. During the last parliament, the Higher Rate 
threshold was reduced in real terms by around 13%. Furthermore an Additional Rate of tax was 
introduced in 2010/11, initially at 50% before being reduced to 45% in 2013/14.  
The increases in the Personal Allowance combined with reduction in Higher Rate threshold and 
introduction of the Additional Rate have together resulted in income tax liabilities becoming 
increasingly concentrated on higher earners. The proportion of the UK adult population who 
pay income tax has fallen from 66% in 2007/8 to 56% in 2015/16. The proportion of income 
tax paid by the top 1% of taxpayers increased from 21.3% to 27.5% between 1999/2000 and 
2015/16, whilst the proportion paid by the top 10% increased from 50.3% to 58.9%. 
The concentration of tax revenues on higher earners has also resulted in a regional 
concentration of income tax revenues  with those parts of the UK with the highest proportion of 
high earners (London and the South East) contributing most. It seems likely that these policy 
changes have limited the convergence in income tax revenues per capita between Scotland 
and the UK that might otherwise have occurred had tax policy changes been neutral.  
2015 ó present 
Whilst growth in UK GDP per head has been weak, growing just 2.3% between Q1 2015 and Q2 
2017, Scottish growth has been weaker still, with per capita GDP growing just 0.57% over the 
same period.  
7KLVPLJKWVLJQDOEDGQHZVZLWKUHJDUGVWRWKHJURZWKRI6FRWODQGöVLQFRPHWD[EDVHIndeed 
6FRWODQGöVHPSOR\PHQWUDWHKDVIDOWHUHGUHODWLYHWRWKH8.UDWHVLQFH&KDUWDQG
Scottish average wages have grown half a percent less than UK wages. 
2QWKHRWKHUKDQGZKLOVW6FRWODQGöVODERXUPDUNHWSHUIRUPDQFHUHODWLYHWRWKH8.öVKDVEHHQ
somewhat weaker since the start of 2015, the difference in labour market performance is 
marginal compared to the substantial difference in GDP per capita. And the latest labour 
market figures provide some evidence that ó after a poor 2015 and 2016 ó 6FRWODQGöVODERXU
market is showing something of a rebound. 
Summary 
For most of the period since 1999, Scottish GDP per capita has grown at a similar rate to UK 
GDP per capita. But the main determinants of income tax revenues, employment and wages, 
appear to have evolved somewhat independently from GDP.  
In the earlier period, 1999- 2007, income tax revenues per capita in Scotland grew more 
quickly than those in the UK, reflecting a combination of both faster wage and employment 
growth. Between 2007 - 2015, there was no further convergence in income tax revenues per 
capita, despite continued wage convergence. 
It remains unclear therefore to what extent the significantly slower GDP per capita growth in 
Scotland recently will be reflected in Scotland having materially slower growth in its income tax 
base (and thus income tax revenues) in 2017/185. 
4. Conclusions
There must in principle be a reasonably strong correlation between growth of GDP per capita 
and growth of income tax revenues per capita. In the current environment of high employment 
rates, the only way to grow GDP per capita is through improvements in productivity. Similarly, 
productivity improvements are a necessary (but not in themselves sufficient) condition for real 
wages to grow. 
But a large variety of factors mean that this relationship is likely to be much weaker in the 
short term. The tax base is determined not only by the wages and income of those in work, but 
also by income from pensions and other factors that are only weakly linked to 
contemporaneous economic activity. The way in which growth is shared between labour and 
capital, and the way in which labour income gains are distributed across the labour force also 
matters. Changes in tax policy can influence the size of the tax base for a given level of activity. 
And short term variations in economic activity might not show up immediately in wages or 
employment. 
The relationship between GDP and tax revenues is further weakened due to geographical and 
temporal differences in the recording of economic activity relative to the receipt of incomes 
associated with that activity. 
5 2017/18 is the first fiscal year during which full income tax revenues are transferred to the Scottish Parliament. For 
the Scottish budget, what is important is how Scottish income tax revenues per capita grow between 16/17 and 
17/18, relative to the growth rate of equivalent revenues in rUK.  
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What matters for the Scottish budget under the new Fiscal Framework is how Scottish income 
tax revenues (per capita) grow relative to the equivalent revenues per capita in rUK. Two 
questions of critical importance are therefore: 
 First, will the recent slowdown in Scottish GDP per capita growth relative to the UK
continue?; and
 Second, if the relative slowdown in GDP per capita growth does continue, what might
this mean for Scottish income tax revenues and the Scottish budget?
Growth of UK GDP per capita has been particularly slow since the financial crisis, and the latest 
forecasts by both the Bank of England and the OBR foresee a continuation of these historically 
slow growth rates over the coming years. Indeed, the significant downward revisions to both 
IRUHFDVW*'3JURZWKDQGZDJHJURZWKLQWKH2%5öVlatest Economic and Fiscal Outlook have as 
common cause the weak forecasts for productivity growth. The Bank of England, in its 
November 2017 Inflation Report, argued that the capacity of the UK economy to grow before 
inflationary pressures mount has fallen to 1.5%, again as a result of weaker productivity 
growth. 
,QWKLVFRQWH[WPLJKWWKHJURZWKFDSDFLW\RI6FRWODQGöVHFRQRP\EHPDWHULDOO\KLJKHURUORZHU
WKDQWKH8.öV"An optimistic argument is that the recent slowdown in 6FRWODQGöVeconomic 
growth will prove to be short-lived, linked primarily to particular challenges facing the offshore 
sector and the knock-on effects for those parts of the onshore economy linked (directly or 
indirectly) to the oil and gas sector. A more pessimistic outlook is that the changes to the 
offshore and financial services industries ó two main drivers of productivity growth prior to the 
financial crisis ó DUHOLNHO\WRZHDNHQ6FRWODQGöVJURZWKFDSDFLWy over a more medium term 
period, potentially weakening the supply side of the economy further in the process. 
But even if we accept the argument that the outlook for economic growth is weaker in 
Scotland, it is less clear that this will imply that wage growth will be fundamentally lower over 
the next few years, not least because Scottish wages are likely to be determined to an extent 
by growth in UK average productivity (and wages) rather than productivity in individual firms or 
sectors. 
From this point of view, slower growth in Scottish GDP per capita without materially slower 
growth in income tax revenues per capita is not inconceivable as an outcome. 7KLVGRHVQöW
mean that GDP growth is not important as a measure of long-term trends in average living 
standards. But it is not the sole (or even the main) determinant of income tax revenues in the 
short-term. 
On the 14 December 2017 the Scottish Fiscal Commission will publish its first ever forecasts 
for Scottish GDP growth and Scottish income tax revenues over the next five years. It will be 
interesting to see what judgement the Commission has come to about the relationship 
between GDP and income tax revenues ó and what this means for the Scottish budget. 
The transition to a low carbon energy system: insights on 
the role of the oil and gas sector 
Grant Allan and Eleanor Malloy  
Fraser of Allander Institute, Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde 
1. Introduction and context
2017 has been significant year for energy activity in Scotland, both on a policy and 
technological front. Since the start of the year, the Scottish Government has launched its draft 
Scottish Energy Strategy (Scottish Government, 2017a) and draft Climate Change Plan 
(Scottish Government, 2017b) underpinning policy actions to address climate and emissions 
into the early 2030s. Additionally, new energy developments have kept on coming. On the 
electricity side, the latest data show that renewable electricity generation was 26% higher in 
the second quarter of 2017 than the same period in 2016.  Total renewable electricity capacity 
URVHE\RYHUWKHVDPHSHULRG7KHUHZHUHDOVRPDMRUøILUVWVùLQFOXGLQJ+\ZLQG6FRWODQG- 
WKHZRUOGöVILUVWIORDWLQJRIIVKRUHZLQG farm ó beginning operation from October 2017 (Statoil, 
2017) and the first ever coal-IUHHZRUNLQJGD\IRU*UHDW%ULWDLQöVHOHFWULFLW\JHQHUDWLRQPL[LQ
April (Financial Times, 2017).  
Firmly embedded in the Scottish Energy Strategy is the view that existing skills and expertise in 
the oil and gas industry  can position Scotland for the transition to a low carbon economy, 
perhaps especially in the renewables sector. In an important element of the consultation of its 
draft Energy Strategy, the Scottish Government asked a series of questions about the role for 
the oil and gas sector in the decades to come, as Scotland moves towards a low carbon 
economy (Scottish Government, 2017b).  
In a speech to the National Economic Forum the First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, made the 
FRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQFXUUHQWHQHUJ\VHFWRUDFWLYLWLHVDQGøNQRZ-KRZùDQGIXWXUHRSSRUWXQLWLHV
LQORZFDUERQWHFKQRORJLHVø7KHRLODQGJDVVHFWRUZLOOFRQWLQXHWRSOD\DQLPSRUWDQWUROHLQ
meeting Scotland's future energy requirements. And of course, the industry also supports 
skills, investment, research and development and infrastructure for the wider energy sector. 
Because of that, it can play an important part in the development of low-carbon technologies ó 
for example [in] offshore renewable HQHUJ\ù,QWKHIRUHZRUGWRWKH6FRWWLVK(QHUJ\6WUDWHJ\
the Minister for Business, Innovation and Energy ó Paul Wheelhouse ó QRWHVøWKHH[SORUDWLRQ
and production of oil and gas in Scottish waters will continue to provide high-value 
employment and a stable energy supply for decades to come. Our ambition is that these 
strengths should also provide the engineering and technical bedrock for the transformational 
FKDQJHLQ6FRWODQGöVHQHUJ\V\VWHPRYHUWKHFRPLQJGHFDGHVù6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWD
p.1).
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The recent report on the submissions received (Why Research, 2017) identified that some 
UHVSRQVHVVWUHVVHGWKHøLPSRUWDQFHIRU6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWKHOSLQJWRVXSSRUWDQG
encourage transfer of skills from the oil and gas sector and its supply chain to the renewables 
VHFWRUù7KLVLVDIXQGDPHQWDOLVVXHDQGJHWVWRWKHKHDUWRIWKHUROHIRUWKHRLODQGJDVVHFWRU
LQFRQWULEXWLQJWR6FRWODQGDQGWKH8.öVHFRQRPLFREMHFWLYHVIRUWKHWUDQVLWLRQWRDORZFDUERQ
economy. 
These recent statements suggest a number of important research questions that this note 
seeks to shed some new light.  
 First, to what extent are firms active in the oil and gas sector considering opportunities
in the renewables sector?
 Second, how does the expectation of being involved in renewables activities differ
between firms in the sector? And, are there differences across firm sizes or between
international or domestic (UK) firms?
 Third, are the positive motivations towards renewable activities stronger for firms with
more optimistic attitudes towards their future oil and gas activities? Or are oil and gas
firms seeking opportunities in renewables to help them diversify over the short-term?
This point matters: recent news of the more positive outlook of firms towards the sector
could lead to firms scaling back from expanding into such renewables markets.
 )LQDOO\KRZGRRLODQGJDVILUPVöDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVUHQHZDEOHVFRPSDUHWRRWKHUøQRQ-
RLODQGJDVSURGXFWLRQùDFWLYLWLHVQDPHO\GHFRPPLVVLRQLQJDQGøXQFRQYHQWLRQDOùRLO
and gas activities? These serve as interesting comparisons ó as both are areas where
WKHUHLVH[SHFWDWLRQWKDWRLODQGJDVH[SHUWLVHFDQEHøFDUULHGRYHUùWRWKHVHQHZ
market opportunities.
To help address these questions we use a unique dataset on oil and gas firms active in the UK 
gathered through the long-UXQQLQJõ2LODQG*DV6XUYH\öó a collaboration between the Fraser of 
Allander Institute and Aberdeen and Grampian Chamber of Commerce. The next section sets 
out the unique properties of this survey, and the rich dataset it provides, while Section 3 
examines the questions raised earlier using data from this survey. 
2. The õ2LODQG*DV6XUYH\öDXQLTXHGDWDVHW
This note draws principally from the long-running Oil and Gas Survey, jointly delivered by the 
Fraser of Allander Institute and Aberdeen and Grampian Chamber of Commerce. This is a 
postal and online survey of companies with a UK presence and active in the oil and gas 
industry, and covers areas including business optimism, activities, investment, skills and 
employment of these firms.  
Undertaken twice annually since 2004 ó published in the Spring and Autumn of the year ó this 
provides a unique time series on the business activities of oil and gas industry in the UK. The 
most recent issue of the survey (number 27) was published on 30 November 2017, and 
highlighted the current challenges facing the sector (AGCC, 2017). The most recent survey 
received responses from companies with a total UK employment of over 40,000. With total 
direct and indirect employment in the UK supported by the offshore oil and gas sector of 
around 170,0006, we can see that this survey captures a substantial portion of firms active in 
the UK oil and gas sector. 
Having a time series of data permits a host of other questions to be analysed, and in this note 
ZHGUDZRQTXHVWLRQVDVNHGLQUHFHQW\HDUVVSHFLILFDOO\DERXWILUPVöDWWLWXGHVWRUHQHZDEOHV
Specifically, since survey 19 (Autumn 2013ZHKDYHUHJXODUO\DVNHGWKHTXHVWLRQø/RRNLQJWR
the medium term (three to five years) do you think your organisation will be more involved in 
UHQHZDEOHV"ù7DQGILUPVFDQFKRVHIURPILYHSRVVLEOHDQVZHUVø'HILQLWHO\ùø3RVVLEO\ù
ø8QOLNHO\ùø1RùDQGø1RWDSSOLFDEOHù5HVSRQVHVWRWKLVTXHVWLRQDQGWKHRWKHUUHVSRQVHV
JLYHQE\ILUPVWRWKHVDPHVXUYH\RIIHUVDIDVFLQDWLQJLQVLJKWLQWRRLODQGJDVILUPVöEHKDYLRXUV
and attitudes towards renewables. By cross-UHIHUHQFLQJILUPVöDQVZHUVWRWKLVTXHVWLRQwith 
other questions, we can examine the questions set out above, and ó crucially ó how these 
have evolved over time. 
3. Results
Question 1: Are oil and gas firms considering opportunities in renewables in the medium term? 
The most recent results reveal that 54% of all contractors anticipate becoming more involved 
LQUHQHZDEOHVLQWKHPHGLXPWHUPUHVSRQGLQJHLWKHUø'HILQLWHO\ùRUø3RVVLEO\ù:HIRFXVRQ
contractors here as it is these firms who operate in the supply chain for oil and gas operators 
whom are most likely to have the expertise which might be carried across to renewables 
activities. This latest total figure is in line with the 53% of contractors who gave either of these 
responses in Survey 25, and is only slightly higher than the 51% of contractors giving these 
responses when the question was first asked in Survey 19.  
Despite this almost static headline finding, there are interesting changes when we look at the 
specific answers to this question over the history of the survey.  
The first time thHTXHVWLRQZDVDVNHG6XUYH\RIFRQWUDFWRUVUHSOLHGø'HILQLWHO\ù
ZKLOHQRWHGWKH\ZRXOGø3RVVLEO\ùEHLQYROYHGLQUHQHZDEOHVRYHUWKHPHGLXPWHUP
Figure 1 shows how the share of contractors giving each possible response has changed since 
that first time it was asked, with the change shown relative to the initial values from Survey 19 
6 Oil and Gas UK (2017) estimate that a total of 302,000 jobs in the UK are supported by the offshore oil and gas 
industry. We compare the UK employment of firms responding to the Oil and Gas Survey to the total of direct and 
indirect employment as firms which are captured in the survey are unlikely to have employment supported through 
induced expenditures related to oil and gas activities. 
7 This question has been asked in Survey 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27, covering the period from Autumn 2013 to 
Autumn 2017. 
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(i.e. an increase (decrease) above the horizontal axis suggests a growing (declining) share of 
contractors giving each response to the same question). 
Figure 1: Change in the share of contractors selecting each response, relative to Survey 19 
baseline 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
6RXUFH)$,$*&&VXUYH\VYDULRXV\HDUVDQGDXWKRUVöFDOFXODWLRQV 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
We can see two distinct periods in Figure 1. Between Survey 19 and Survey 23 (Autumn 2013 
DQG$XWXPQZHVHHWKDWILUPVöDUHXQVXUHDERXWWKHLUIXWXUHLQYROYHPHQWLQUHQHZDEOHV
There is little change in the share of those positively motivated towards renewables work - the 
VKDUHVRIILUPVUHVSRQGLQJHLWKHUø'HILQLWHO\ùRUø3RVVLEO\ùIDOOVZLWKWKHRQO\LQFUHDVHLQ
WKRVHLGHQWLI\LQJIXWXUHUHQHZDEOHVZRUNDVø8QOLNHO\ù 
From Survey 24 (Spring 2016) onwards, we see firms making up their minds; moving away from 
an uncertain position, and towards stronger (i.e. more positive, or more negative) responses. 
Survey 27 now sees 31% of contractors (up 17 percentage points from the first time this 
TXHVWLRQZDVDVNHGUHSRUWLQJWKDWWKH\H[SHFWWRø'HILQLWHO\ùEHLQYROYHGLQUHQHZDEOHVLQWKH
medium term. This largely mirrors a fall in those sa\LQJWKH\ZRXOGø3RVVLEO\ùEHLQYROYHGLQ
renewables (down 14%). At the same time, only 11% of contractors feel that they will not be 
involved in renewables (down 8%). 
4XHVWLRQGRHVILUPVL]HRUWKHORFDWLRQRIRZQHUVKLSPDWWHUIRUILUPVöDWWLWXGHVWRwards 
renewables? 
Table 1 shows that larger oil and gas contractors (by number of UK employees) are typically 
more favourable towards renewables. 54% of firms with more than 100 employees report 
HLWKHUø'HILQLWHO\ùRUø3RVVLEO\ùZRUNLQJLQUHQHZDEOHVLQWKe medium term, while 82% of firms 
with more than 500 employees give these responses.  
Table 1: ø/RRNLQJWRWKHPHGLXPWHUPGR\RXWKLQNWKDW\RXURUJDQLVDWLRQZLOOEHPRUH
LQYROYHGLQUHQHZDEOHV"ùUHVSRQGLQJE\FROXPQVFRQWUDFWRUV6XUYH\ 
Number of UK 
employees 
Yes, 
definitely 
Yes, 
possibly 
Unlikely No 
Not 
relevant 
Total 
% responding 
ø'HILQLWHO\ùSOXV
ø3RVVLEO\ù 
1-20 25% 25% 32% 11% 7% 100% 50% 
21-99 25% 21% 33% 8% 13% 100% 46% 
100-499 36% 18% 27% 9% 9% 100% 54% 
500+ 55% 27% 0% 18% 0% 100% 82% 
Note: Rows may not sum due to rounding. % of contractors. 
6RXUFH)$,$*&&VXUYH\VYDULRXV\HDUVDQGDXWKRUVöFDOFXODWLRQV 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
4XHVWLRQKRZGRILUPVöDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVrenewables differ between domestic and 
international firms? 
Table 2: ø/RRNLQJWRWKHPHGLXPWHUPGR\RXWKLQNWKDW\RXURUJDQLVDWLRQZLOOEHPRUH
LQYROYHGLQUHQHZDEOHV"ùUHVSRQGLQJE\FROXPQVFRQWUDFWRUV6XUYH\ 
Number of UK 
employees 
Yes, 
definitely 
Yes, 
possibly 
Unlikely No 
Not 
relevant 
Total 
% responding 
ø'HILQLWHO\ùSOXV
ø3RVVLEO\ù 
UK oriented 
firms 
31% 26% 29% 6% 9% 100% 57% 
Internationally 
oriented firms 
33% 11% 22% 28% 6% 100% 44% 
Note: Rows may not sum due to rounding. % of contractors. See text for definitions. 
6RXUFH)$,$*&&VXUYH\VYDULRXV\HDUVDQGDXWKRUVöFDOFXODWLRQV 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
In the survey we do not ask firms to identify the location of their headquarters, or where they 
conduct most of their business. Thus, we cannot be clear on which firms are UK or 
internationally owned. However, we do know the total employment of each firm, and each 
ILUPVöHPSOR\PHQWERWKLQDQGRXWZLWKWKH8.:HFDQSUR[\ for ownership/headquarters by 
LGHQWLI\LQJDVø8.RULHQWHGùWKRVHILUPVZKHUHDPDMRULW\RIWKHLUWRWDOHPSOR\PHQWLVLQWKH
8.DQGø,QWHUQDWLRQDOO\RULHQWHGùILUPVZKHUHWKHRSSRVLWHLVWKHFDVH7KHUHVXOWVRIWKLV
categorisation for contractor firms in the most recent survey is shown in Table 2.  
There is a more positive expectation for renewables activities among those firms that are UK 
oriented on this measure. Almost 60% of respondents with a majority of their employment in 
WKH8.ø'HILQLWHO\ùRUøSRVVLEO\ùVHHUHQHZDEOHVZRUNLQWKHLUPHGLXPWHrm future, while the 
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ILJXUHLVIRUøLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\RULHQWHGùILUPV6LPLODUO\WKHVKDUHRIFRQWUDFWRUVDQVZHULQJ
ø1RùLVFRQVLGHUDEO\KLJKHUIRU,QWHUQDWLRQDOO\RULHQWHGILUPV 
Question 3: how do current levels of activity and optimism about the future of UKCS relate to 
enthusiasm for renewables?
:HFDQFRPSDUHILUPVöDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVUHQHZDEOHVDJDLQVWFXUUHQWOHYHOVRIDFWLYLW\ó 
UHODWLYHWRILUPVöDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHLUøRSWLPXPùOHYHORIDFWLYLW\ó and also against their 
confidence about the short-term future level of activity (i.e. 12 months into the future). These 
are shown in Tables 3 and 4 below.  
Tables 3 VKRZVWKHUHODWLRQVKLSIURPWKHPRVWUHFHQWVXUYH\EHWZHHQILUPVöFXUUHQWVHOI-
GHWHUPLQHGOHYHOVRIDFWLYLW\FRPSDUHGWRWKHLUøRSWLPXPù levels and their attitudes towards 
renewables.  
We see that attitudes towards renewables are positive across all levels of current activity. A 
PDMRULW\RIDOOILUPVDWHDFKDFWLYLW\OHYHOUHVSRQGWKDWWKH\ø'HILQLWHO\ùRUø3RVVLEO\ù
anticipated being involved in renewables in the medium term.  
Table 3: ø/RRNLQJWRWKHPHGLXPWHUPGR\RXWKLQNWKDW\RXURUJDQLVDWLRQZLOOEHPRUH
LQYROYHGLQUHQHZDEOHV"ùUHVSRQGLQJE\FROXPQVE\OHYHORIFXUUHQWDFWLYLW\UHODWLYHWR
optimum levels, all firms, Survey 27 
By level of 
current 
activity 
Yes, 
definitely 
Yes, 
possibly 
Unlikely No 
Not 
relevant 
Total 
% responding 
ø'HILQLWHO\ù
SOXVø3RVVLEO\ù 
Above 
optimum 
levels 
33% 33% 17% 17% 0% 100% 67% 
At optimum 
levels 17% 38% 13% 17% 17% 100% 55% 
Below 
optimum 
levels 
32% 17% 31% 10% 10% 100% 59% 
Note: Rows may not sum due to rounding. % of all firms. 
6RXUFH)$,$*&&VXUYH\VYDULRXV\HDUVDQGDXWKRUVöFDOFXODWLRQV 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
We can see from Table 4 that ó perhaps surprisingly ó H[SHFWDWLRQVDERXWø'HILQLWHO\ùRU
ø3RVVLEO\ùEHLQJLQYROYHGLQUHQHZDEOHVLQWKHPHGLXPWHUPDUHKLJKHUDPRQJWKRVHILUPV
ZKLFKDUHPRUHSRVLWLYHDERXWWKHEXVLQHVVVLWXDWLRQLQPRQWKVöWLPH7KXVRXUUHVXOW
appear to suggest that oil and gas firms who are more optimistic about the future of the oil and 
gas industry, are also those expecting to have involvement in renewables.  
Table 4 ø/RRNLQJWRWKHPHGLXPWHUPGR\RXWKLQNWKDW\RXURUJDQLVDWLRQZLOOEHPRUH
involved LQUHQHZDEOHV"ùUHVSRQGLQJE\FROXPQVE\H[SHFWDWLRQVRIWKHEXVLQHVVVLWXDWLRQ
LQWKH8.&6LQPRQWKVöWLPH 
More or less 
confident about 
the business 
situation in 12 
months' time 
Yes, 
definitely 
Yes, 
possibly 
Unlikely No 
Not 
relevant 
Total 
% responding 
ø'HILQLWHO\ù
plus 
ø3RVVLEO\ù 
More 35% 23% 19% 12% 12% 100% 58% 
The same 27% 22% 24% 14% 14% 100% 49% 
Less 0% 38% 50% 12% 0% 100% 38% 
Note: Rows may not sum due to rounding. % of all firms. 
6RXUFH)$,$*&&VXUYH\VYDULRXV\HDUVDQGDXWKRUVöcalculations 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
4XHVWLRQ+RZGRILUPVöDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVUHQHZDEOHVFRPSDUHWRRWKHUøQRQ-SURGXFWLRQù
activities? 
8VLQJWKHTXHVWLRQVIURPWKHVXUYH\ZHFDQFRPSDUHRLODQGJDVILUPVöDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGV
renewables and ó in turn - unconventional oil and gas activities and decommissioning.  
Table 5: 4XHVWLRQø/RRNLQJWRWKHPHGLXPWHUPGR\RXWKLQNWKDW\RXURUJDQLVDWion will be 
PRUHLQYROYHGLQUHQHZDEOHV"ùVKRZQLQFROXPQVZKLOHURZ4XHVWLRQø/RRNLQJWRWKH
medium term, do you think that your organisation will be more involved in unconventional oil 
DQGJDVDFWLYLW\LQWKH8."ùRIDOOILUPVUHVSRQGLQJWRERWKTXestions, excluding those 
LQGLFDWLQJø1RWUHOHYDQWù6XUYH\ 
Involved in renewables in the medium term? 
Yes, definitely Yes, possibly Unlikely No 
Involved in 
unconventionals 
in the UK in the 
medium term? 
Yes, 
definitely 
6 4 3 0 
Yes, 
possibly 
18 11 16 4 
Unlikely 9 10 8 3 
No 0 1 1 8 
Note: % of all firms answering both questions. May not add to 100% due to rounding. 
6RXUFH)$,$*&&VXUYH\VYDULRXV\HDUVDQGDXWKRUVöFDOFXODWLRQV 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
:HVHWRXWILUPVörelative attitudes to renewables and unconventional oil and gas activities in 
Table 5. Some explanation of the table is in order, however. Summing each row, we can 
LGHQWLI\WKHPRVWUHVSRQVHVWRILUPVöH[SHFWDWLRQVRIEHLQJLQYROYHGLQøXQFRQYHQWLRQDOVù
 Fraser of Allander Institute
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7DEOHVKRZVWKDWWKHPRVWFRPPRQDQVZHUZDVø<HVSRVVLEO\ùZLWKRIILUPVJLYLQJ
this response. Summing each column, we can see that the most common aQVZHUIRUILUPVö
H[SHFWDWLRQVRIEHLQJLQYROYHGLQUHQHZDEOHVZDVø<HVGHILQLWHO\ùRIILUPV 
As each firm responded to both renewables and unconventionals questions, we can identify 
the relative outlook for these opportunities. We can simplify this by identifying three areas 
(shaded in different tones in Table 4).  
The light grey area identifies firms who had equal anticipation of their involvement in 
renewables and unconventionals. These are on the diagonal entries in Table 4 and capture 
total 33% of all responses.  
The light red area corresponds to firms whose attitudes are more positive towards renewables 
than for unconventionals. We identify 39% of all firms to be in this area. 
Of the alternative case ó i.e. those firms more positive about their involvement in UK 
unconventionals than renewables ó we mark these in the dark red shaded area. This group 
comprises 29% of all firms. 
Figure 2: 2LODQGJDVFRPSDQLHVöH[SHFWDWLRQVRILQYROYHPHQWLQUHQHZDEOHVLQWKHQH[WWKUHH
to five years relative to their expectations of involvement in unconventional oil and gas activity 
in the UK, % of all firms responding to both questions Survey 23 to 27 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: FAI/AGCC surveys YDULRXV\HDUVDQGDXWKRUVöFDOFXODWLRQV 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
The latest results therefore suggest that oil and gas firms are more positive towards their 
future involvement in renewables than unconventional oil and gas work in the UK.  
 But how has this relative DWWLWXGHEHWZHHQILUPVöH[SHFWDWLRQVLQUHQHZDEOHVDQG
unconventional oil and gas changed over time?  
Figure 2 shows that the net share of oil and gas firms more positive about their future 
involvement in renewables compared to unconventionals is at a record high. This reflects a 
decline in the share of firms being more positive about unconventionals, but also a fall in 
those firms being equally positive between both activities.  
We now repeat this for renewables expectations against decommissioning. We know that there 
are significant decommissioning activities currently occurring in the UK. Oil and Gas UK (2017) 
note that there around over 100 north east of Scotland companies involved in the Brent 
decommissioning project, and that around 85% of project spend to 2025 will be made in the 
UK.  
Table 6: 4XHVWLRQø/RRNLQJWRWKHPHGLXPWHUPGR\RXWKLQNWKDW\RXURUJDQLVDWLRQZLOO be 
PRUHLQYROYHGLQUHQHZDEOHV"ù 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Involved in renewables in the medium term? 
Yes, definitely Yes, possibly Unlikely No 
Involved in 
decommissioning 
in the UK in the 
medium term? 
Yes, 
definitely 
20 8 8 4 
Yes, 
possibly 
10 18 15 5 
Unlikely 3 0 0 0 
No 0 1 4 5 
Note: % of all firms answering both questions. All cells may not add to 100% due to rounding. 
6RXUFH)$,$*&&VXUYH\VYDULRXV\HDUVDQGDXWKRUVöcalculations 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
We can see from comparing across row and column totals that firms have higher expectations 
of being involved in decommissioning than renewables. Summing across the first two rows, we 
FDQVHHWKDWILUPVH[SHFWWREHø'HILQLWHO\ùRUø3RVVLEO\ùLQYROYHGLn decommissioning, 
while (summing down the first two columns) only 57% of firms have the same expectations for 
renewables.  
It is no surprise that more firms have a higher expectation of being involved in 
decommissioning activities than in renewables: 43% of firms (in the dark red area) compared 
to 17% (the light red area), with 40% of firms having the same expectations in both activities 
(i.e. the diagonal in Table 6).  
One final point to examine is how attitudes to renewables, unconventionals and 
decommissioning have changed over the past couple of years. Using the same framework as 
above, we can show how the share of firms responding to these questions has evolved. 
 Fraser of Allander Institute
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)LJXUHUHLQIRUFHVWKHYLHZWKDWILUPVöH[SHFWDWLRQVRILQYROYHPHQWLQUHQHZDEOHVKDVW\SLcally 
been more muted than for decommissioning. But the current value of 17% of firms more 
positive about involvement in renewables is another high, and has risen from 7% to 17% of all 
firms between 2015 and 2017 (Surveys 23 and 27).  
Figure 3: Oil and gas FRPSDQLHVöH[SHFWDWLRQVRILQYROYHPHQWLQUHQHZDEOHVLQWKHQH[WWKUHH
to five years relative to their expectations of involvement in decommissioning activity, % of all 
firms responding to both questions, Survey 23 to 27 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
6RXUFH)$,$*&&VXUYH\VYDULRXV\HDUVDQGDXWKRUVöFDOFXODWLRQV 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
4. Conclusions
The transition to a low carbon energy system is a major policy focus in Scotland, as is ensuring 
that economic opportunities in new renewables technologies are harnessed.  The opportunity 
exists that the UK / Scotland can build on the expertise gained over many decades in the oil 
and gas sector and that oil and gas companies can develop new UK market opportunities in 
the renewables sector. 
To help answer questions round this low carbon transition, we have analysed the responses of 
oil and gas companies over the past four years in the long-runniQJø2LODQG*DV6XUYH\ùó a 
collaboration between the Fraser of Allander Institute and Aberdeen and Grampian Chamber of 
Commerce - to help shed light on the sentiments of oil and gas companies active in the UK 
towards their future involvement in renewables activity.  
In answer the questions set out above, our analysis of this unique dataset allows us to make 
the following tentative conclusions: 
)LUVWVLQFHWKHVWDUWRIWKHUHKDVEHHQDQLQFUHDVHLQILUPVøPDNLQJXSWKHLUPLQGVù
towards their involvement in renewables, and towards stronger (i.e. more positive, or more 
QHJDWLYHUHVSRQVHV7KHPRVWUHFHQWGDWDVXJJHVWWKDWRIFRQWUDFWRUVøGHILQLWHO\ùH[SHFW
to be involved in renewables in the medium term, up 17 percentage points from 2013 when 
this question was first asked. 
Second, it appears that positive inclinations towards future involvement in renewables is 
VWURQJHUDPRQJODUJHUILUPVLHWKRVHRYHUHPSOR\HHVDQGDPRQJILUPVZKLFKDUHø8.
RULHQWHGùLQWKHLUEXVLQHVVDFWLYLWLHVDOWKRXJKthe measure of this is necessarily proxied using 
employment levels ó and which might be a poor proxy for the markets in which a firm 
undertakes activities, or where firms are headquartered/owned). 
7KLUGWKHUHLVEURDGO\HTXDOVXSSRUWIRUILUPVöIXWXUHLQYolvement in renewables when 
compared to their current level of activity. Those firms reporting being beyond optimum levels 
were slightly more positive than those below, but the difference was small. Looking to the next 
twelve months, firms who are more optimistic about the future of the oil and gas activities in 
the UK continental shelf are also those expecting to have greater involvement in renewables. 
)LQDOO\ZHVHHWKDWILUPVöH[SHFWDWLRQVWRZDUGVUHQHZDEOHVFRPSDUHGWRXQFRQYHQWLRQDO
activities and decRPPLVVLRQLQJKDYHPRYHGRYHUWKHSDVWWZR\HDUV)LUPVöDUHQRZPRUH
positive about renewables involvement than at any point previously when compared to 
XQFRQYHQWLRQDORLODQGJDVZRUNLQWKH8.ZKLOHILUPVöH[SHFWDWLRQVDERXWWKHLULQYROYHPHQW
in decommissioning remain more positive, reflecting ongoing activities in this activity in the 
UK.  
 Fraser of Allander Institute
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6FRWODQGöV,QQRYDWLRQ3HUIRUPDQFHDUHYLHZRIUHFHQW
evidence 
Jennifer Turnbull & Kenny Richmond 
Scottish Enterprise8 
1. Introduction
7KLVSDSHUVXPPDULVHVUHFHQWGDWDRQ6FRWODQGöVLQQRYDWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHDQGKRZWKLV
compares to other countries, using data from the UK Innovation Survey and the European 
8QLRQöV&RPPXQLW\,QQRYDWLRQ6XUYH\ 
7KHSDSHUDVVHVVHVWKHUHDVRQVIRU6FRWODQGöVDEVROXWHDQGUHODWLYHLPSURYHPHQWLQ
innovation activity by examining the performance of individual types of innovation. The paper 
FRQFOXGHVWKDWDOWKRXJK6FRWODQGöVKHDGOLQHLQQRYDWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHKDVLPSURYHGWKLVKDV
EHHQGULYHQPRUHE\LPSURYHGSHUIRUPDQFHRIõRUJDQLVDWLRQDOLQQRYDWLRQöWKDQE\FRPSDQLHV
introducing new products, services or processes. This implications of this for company 
performance are unclear.  
2. Why is innovation important?
The importance of innovation in driving economic growth is well established.  Innovation is a 
critical factor for determining productivity growth, for example new and improved 
products/services can boost business sales and increase value add, and new processes or 
better organisation can increase efficiency9.    
Research shows that innovative businesses grow twice as fast, both in employment and sales, 
as bXVLQHVVHVWKDWGRQöWLQQRYDWH10.   
7KHSURSRUWLRQRIEXVLQHVVHVWKDWDUHLQQRYDWLQJLVDNH\LQGLFDWRULQWKHõ7KH6FRWODQG&DQ'Rö
measurement framework11.  
8 Scottish Enterprise is Scotland's main economic development agency. 
9 Productivity Handbook, ONS 
10 Business Growth and Innovation, Nesta 2009 
11 http://www.cando.scot/indicators/innovating-business/  
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3. Innovation data sources
7KLVSDSHUFRQVLGHUVWKHPHDVXUHRIõLQQRYDWLRQDFWLYHöDQGperformance in 2012-14 
compared to 2010-2012. A business is defined as being innovation active if it is engaged in 
any of the following activities12:   
1. Introduction of a new or significantly improved product (good or service) or process;
2. Engagement in innovation projects not yet complete or abandoned;
3. New and significantly improved forms of organisation, business structures or practices and
marketing concepts or strategies
A key source of internationally comparable data on business innovation activity is the 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) that provides information for EU member states and a 
number of ESS member countries13.  The CIS is a harmonised survey of innovation activity in 
businesses with 10 or more employees14, designed to provide information on the innovativeness 
RI FRXQWULHVö EXVLQHVVHV RQ GLIIHUHQW W\SHV RI LQQRYDWLRQ DQG RQ YDULRXV DVSHFWV RI WKH
development of an innovation, such as objectives, sources of information, public funding and 
innovation expenditures.  The CIS provides statistics broken down by country, type of 
innovation, sector and business size. 
The UK Innovation Survey is the source of CIS UK data15.  The UK survey includes data for 
Scotland which can be used to compare innovation performance relative to other UK regions.  
Given the contribution that businesses with 10 or more employees make to the Scottish 
economy, they account for around 73% of total employment and 84% of total turnover, the 
VXUYH\SURYLGHVLPSRUWDQWHYLGHQFHRQ6FRWODQGöVLQQRYDWLRQSHUIRUPDQFH 
4. ScotlDQGöV,QQRYDWLRQ3HUIRUPDQFH
6FRWODQGöV LQQRYDWLRQ SHUIRUPDQFH LQ WKH VXUYH\ SHULRG -2014 improved significantly 
compared to the 2010-2012. In 2010-2012 the proportion of innovation active businesses was 
47% with Scotland ranked 19th.  This places Scotland in the third quartile of comparator 
European countries.  In 2012-2014, the proportion increased to 56%, with Scotland ranked in 
9th equal place (with France) at the top of the second quartile of comparator countries. 
12 This is the EU wide definition of innovation active adopted by Eurostat. 
13 The CIS dataset is included in the Science and Technology Section of the Eurostat Database.  See Eurostat 
description of the dataset 
14 So excludes businesses with less than 10 employees 
15 UK Innovation Survey covering the period 2012 to 2014, BIS 
 Fraser of Allander Institute
Figure 1: Innovation Active, % of Businesses 2012-2014 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Compared to other countries, Scotland had the fourth largest percentage point increase in the 
proportion of innovation active businesses between the 2010-12 and 2012-14 surveys. 
Figure 2: Growth in % of Innovation Active Businesses 2010-12 to 2012-14 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
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5. :KDW W\SHV RI LQQRYDWLRQ DUH GULYLQJ 6FRWODQGöV LPSURYHG RYHUDOO
innovation performance?
In practice, businesses are often engaged in one or more of the activities listed in section 3.  The 
data show that most innovation activity by Scottish businesses is product and/or process 
innovation, and organisation and/or marketing innovation. The proportion of businesses in 
Scotland involved in these activities in 2014 is shown in the table below. 
6FRWODQGöV,QQRYDWLRQ$FWLYLW\ 
Activity % of businesses 
Innovative Active 56.4 
 Product and/or process innovation 38.6 
 Organisation and/or marketing innovation 43.3 
A review of more detailed data within these categories helps to highlight specific areas of 
improvement.  As some businesses engage in a single innovation activity only while others 
engage in multiple activities, the results for both types of innovators are shown below16: 
 multiple ó businesses that are involved in a particular type of innovation activity, as well as
other types of activity
 single ó businesses that are involved in just one type of innovation only
In the product example below, this shows that 7% of businesses in Scotland are product only 
innovators (and are not doing any other type of innovation), whereas significant more 
businesses (25%) undertake product and other types of innovation. 
16 see Appendix 1 for an overview of the types of innovation activity 
 Fraser of Allander Institute
Product innovation 
6FRWODQGöVTXDUWLOHSHUIRUPDQFHLQSURGXFWRQO\LQQRYDWLRQZDVEURDGO\PDLQWDLQHGEHWZHHQ
2012 and 2014, falling by only 0.3 percentage points.  This means that overall improvement in 
product innovation was driven by businesses engaging in product innovation plus other 
innovation activities, which increased by 4 percentage points. 
6FRWODQGöV Product Innovation 
performance improved between the 
2012 and 2014 surveys. In 2014 
Scotland ranked 15th out of 32 countries 
and moved up to the 2nd quartile of 
comparator countries. 
Product Innovation Performance 
2012 2014 
International Rank 18 15 
Quartile 3 2 
The proportion of Scottish businesses 
engaging in product innovation only was 
broadly the same in 2014 as it was in 
2012, and in the top quartile of 
countries. 
Product Innovation Only 
2012 2014 
International Rank 4 6 
Quartile 1 1 
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Process Innovation 
The proportion of Scottish businesses engaging in process only innovation increased by 3.3 
percentage points between 2012 and 2014.  However, overall improvement was driven by the 
proportion of businesses engaging in process plus other innovation activity, which increased by 
7.7 percentage points.  
6FRWODQGöV Process Innovation performance 
improved between the 2012 and 2014 
surveys.  In 2014 Scotland ranked 24th out of 
32 countries and moved up to third quartile of 
comparator countries. 
Process Innovation Performance 
2012 2014 
International Rank 29 24 
Quartile 4 3 
The proportion of Scottish businesses 
engaging in process innovation only 
increased by 6 places in the ranking of 
comparator countries. 
Process Innovation Only 
Scotland's 2012 2014 
International Rank 30 24 
Quartile 4 3 
 Fraser of Allander Institute
Organisational innovation 
The proportion of businesses engaging in organisation only innovations increased by 4.2 
percentage points between the 2012 and 2014 surveys.  However, the proportion of businesses 
engaging in organisational plus other innovations increased by 6.8 percentage points. 
Organisational Innovation shows the most 
dramatic improvement in Scotland between the 
 DQG  VXUYH\V  6FRWODQGöV UDQNLQJ
improved to 5th place out of 32 countries and 
moved to the top quartile of comparator countries. 
Organisational Innovation Performance 
2012 2014 
International rank 12 5 
Quartile 2 1 
Scotland maintained its top quartile ranking in the 
proportion of businesses engaging in 
organisational innovation only between 2012 and 
2014. 
Organisational Innovation Only 
2012 2014 
International Rank 1 1 
Quartile 1 1 
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Marketing innovation 
The proportion of businesses engaging in marketing only innovation increased by 1.7 
percentage points between 2012 and 2014, therefore, most of the overall improvement was due 
to the 4.3 percentage point increase in businesses engaging in marketing as well as other 
innovations. 
Marketing Innovation performance is weak in 
Scotland, but some improvement was reported 
between the 2012 and 2014 surveys.  Although 
still in the bottom quartile of comparator countries 
LQ6FRWODQGöVUDQNLQJKDGJRQHXSIURPst 
in 2012 to 25th in 2014. 
Marketing Innovation Performance 
2012 2014 
International rank 31 25 
Quartile 4 4 
6FRWODQGöVUDQNLQJIRUWKHSURSRUWLRQRIPDUNHWLQJ
only innovators increased by 3 places between 
2012 and 2014, but also remained in the bottom 
quartile. 
Marketing Innovation Only 
2012 2014 
Scotland's Rank 31 28 
Quartile 4 4 
The data for multiple innovation activities show that Scotland still has relatively poor 
performance compared to other countries. In Process and Marketing Innovation, and Product 
Innovation Scotland just makes it into the second quartile of comparator countries while the 
performance is high for organisational innovation. 
Overall, to reach the top quartile of comparator countries for overall innovation active 
performance, Scotland would only need an extra 250 10+ employee businesses to become 
innovation active.  However, the gap between Scotland and comparator countries engaging in 
multiple innovation activities is much larger: 
Multiple Innovators -
Innovation Type 
Number of additional 10+ employee businesses 
required to reach the top quartile 
Product Innovation 1,500 
Process Innovator 2,700 
Marketing Innovators 3,000 
Organisational 
Innovators 
0 
7KH GDWD RQ 6FRWODQGöV SHUIRUPDQFH E\ W\SH RI LQQRYDWLRQ DFWLYLW\ KHOSV H[SODLQ 6FRWODQGöV
LPSURYHGSHUIRUPDQFHIRUWKHRYHUDOOKHDGOLQHLQQRYDWLRQDFWLYHPHDVXUH6FRWODQGöVUDQNLQJ
has increased from 19th to 9th by improving or maintaining its ranking performance for all the 
component types of innovation activity, except for the proportion of companies that are only 
involved in product innovation. 
7KHGDWDWKRXJKDOVRVKRZVWKDW6FRWODQGöVRYHUDOOUHODWLYHO\KLJKLQQRYDWLRQDFWLYLW\UDQNLQJ
(9th place) is driven in large part by businesses undertaking organisational innovation only, and 
that SFRWODQGöVEXVLQHVVHVDUHIDUOHVVOLNHO\WKDQWKRVHLQRWKHUFRXQWULHVWREH 
 undertaking process or marketing innovation
 undertaking (or combining) multiple innovation activities
7KLVUDLVHVDNH\TXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHU6FRWODQGöVGHSHQGHQFHRQRUJDQLVDWLRnal innovation is a 
weakness. Further research is planned to assess whether there is a relationship between types 
of innovation activity and business performance, for example in terms of turnover growth and 
productivity.  This will also consider whether there are optimal combinations of innovation 
activity. 
Conclusions 
6FRWODQGöVRYHUDOOSHUIRUPDQFHRI LQQRYDWLRQDFWLYHEXVLQHVV LPSURYHGVLJQLILFDQWO\EHWZHHQ
2010-12 and 2012-14, compared to other CIS European countries. This was due to improved 
performanFHLQHDFKRIWKHPDLQW\SHVRILQQRYDWLRQDFWLYLW\+RZHYHULWLVFOHDUWKDW6FRWODQGöV
innovation performance is driven mainly by organisational innovation rather than by businesses 
introducing new products, services or processes. And Scottish businesses are less likely to 
engage in multiple innovation activities than those in other countries. Further research is 
UHTXLUHG WR DVVHVV ZKHWKHU WKLV LV DQ õLQQRYDWLRQ ZHDNQHVVö FRPSDUHG WR RWKHU FRXQWULHV LQ
terms of business performance and growth. 
 Fraser of Allander Institute
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Appendix A: Types of Innovators Overview 
Source: Eurostat Metadata
The performance of 6FRWODQGöV high growth companies 
Viktoria Bachtler  
Fraser of Allander Institute 
Abstract 
The process of establishing and growing a strong business base is an important hallmark of 
any successful economy. The pace of business start-ups and their subsequent growth has 
challenged policymakers for decades. While there has been a major research focus on 
entrepreneurship in Scotland, less attention has been focused on how Scotland is doing at the 
top end of SMEs. This article examines key data on new high-growth companies in Scotland. It 
first examines the age profile of Scotlandös Top 100 companies, especially the extent to which 
these are new or well-established, and compares this UK and US experience. The article then 
focuses on Scotlandös high growth firms (HGFs), in particular how Scotland performs in 
producing top high growth firms in relation to the UK. A key question is how many of these 
firms are amongst the top performing UK high growth companies and whether this has 
changed over time. 
1. Introduction and background
The process of establishing and growing a strong business base is an important hallmark of any 
successful economy.  The pace of business start-ups and their subsequent growth has been 
something that has challenged policymakers for decades. 
Though Scotland ranks 9th in the UK (out of 12 Government Office Regions) in terms of the 
number of new business registrations each year, there are several examples of Scottish 
companies growing into major world-players such as Skyscanner, FanDuel and Rockstar.  
Though there has been a major research focus on entrepreneurship, regarding new firm 
formation and SME growth, less attention has been focused on how Scotland is doing at the top 
end of SMEs. Previous research by Scottish Enterprise, published by the Fraser Economic 
Commentary, has shown fast-growth firms are important for the economy.17 
This article examines key data on new high-growth companies in Scotland.  First, we examine 
the age profile of 6FRWODQGöV Top 100 companies, especially the extent to which these are new 
or well-established. And we compare this UK and US experience.    
We then focus on Scotlandös high growth firms (HGFs), in particular how Scotland performs in 
producing top high growth firms in relation to the UK and other similar sized countries. A study 
of high growth firms in Scotland undertaken by Scottish Enterprise18 in 2012 showed that 
Scotland had higher rate than the UK of high growth businesses. However, our interest is to know 
17 https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/56659/1/FEC_40_1_2016_HopkinsPRichmondK.pdf 
18 https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/56659/ 
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how many of these firms are amongst the top performing UK high growth companies and whether 
this has changed over time.  
2. How old are 6FRWODQGöV top companies?
6FRWODQGöV Top 100 companies were sourced from the Scottish Business Insider magazine19, 
which produces an annual Top 500 list of Scotlandös best performing public and private 
companies.  
This list is ranked using a combination of annualised turnover and pre-tax profit. The business 
sectors vary with some of the largest turnover coming from Banking and Financial Services, 
Offshore Services, Services & Utilities and Transport.  
Each firm was traced back to identify its year of establishment, in order to avoid misreporting 
company age due to changes in ownership or mergers. If a firm was the result of a merger, the 
age of the oldest merging firm was used.  
Figure 1 shows the age distribution of 6FRWODQGöV Top 100 companies, which range in age from 
11 to 322 years. Very few companies have been created in the past 20 to 30 years, only eight 
companies in total are 30 years or younger and only two were created after 2000.  In contrast, 
34% of companies are over 100 years old, mainly companies in Banking & Financial Services, 
Food & Drink as well as Offshore / Oil & Gas sectors. The average age of a Scottish company in 
the Top 100 is approximately 87 years old.  
Figure 1: Age distribution of the top 100 Scottish firms 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Business Insider Top 500 2017 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
19 http://www.oascotland.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Top-500-Companies-2017.pdf 
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It is interesting to speculate why there are so few companies in the Top 100 established in the 
past two decades. There could be several possible explanations: 
a) there are constraints on new Scottish start-ups experiencing the fast growth required to
enter the Top 100, whether  (e.g. management and marketing expertise) or
external (e.g. availability of finance);
b) it takes a long time to build up a Top 100 firm in increasingly competitive markets;
c) Scotland has not been establishing companies in fast-growing sectors;
d) fast-growing or successful Scottish companies are taken over given the openness of the
UK economy to mergers and acquisitions.
Comparisons can be undertaken with other countries to assess whether 6FRWODQGöV experience 
is unique, or not. It should be noted that are always challenges in comparing countries across 
different databases as each can be compiled in a slightly different way (e.g. revenue and profit 
or just revenue).  
The analysis conducted here therefore is designed to only be illustrative. 
For the US, a comparative assessment was undertaken by drawing on company age data from 
the Fortune 50020 - an annual list of the top public and private companies in the US by revenue 
produced by Fortune magazine.  
A comparison with the UK was more difficult as there does not appear to be a list which ranks 
the top UK public and private firms in a single data set.  
Therefore, the Forbes Global 200021 (a list produced by Forbes magazine which ranks the ZRUOGöV 
top 2000 public companies by a combination of revenue, profits, assets and market value) and 
the Sunday Times HSBC Top Track 10022 (an annual list produced by Sunday Times which ranks 
the 8.öV top 100 private firms by revenue) were merged and then ranked by revenue to create a 
top 100 UK sample. 
Figure 2 provides an interesting perspective on the discussion of the age profile of Scottish 
companies in a comparison to UK and US experience. 
For top UK companies, nearly 50% were founded before 1900.  The average age of a UK company 
in the combined Forbes and HSBC Top Track list is 124 years old.   
For the US, the situation is slightly different, with the majority of companies being slightly 
younger, with approximately 73% have been founded before 1950 with the average age being 
101 years. 
In comparison, top Scottish companies are younger, with nearly 50% having been established 
since 1950.  
20 http://fortune.com/fortune500/list/  
21 https://www.forbes.com/global2000/list/#tab:overall  
22 http://www.fasttrack.co.uk/league-tables/top-track-100/league-table/  
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Figure 2: Age distribution of the top 100 Scottish, US and UK firms 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
3. 6FRWODQGöV performance in producing high growth firms (HGFs)
Here we report on 6FRWODQGöV top performing high growth firms, using the 2(&'öV definition of 
high growth firms as õHQWHUSULVHV with average annualised growth in employees or turnover 
greater than 20 percent per annum, over a three year period, and with more than 10 employees 
in the beginning of the observation SHULRGö.  
As discussed in a 2016 article in the Fraser Economic Commentary23, although only a small 
proportion of companies achieve rapid growth, they are key drivers for economic growth and job 
creation as they generate a disproportionate level of turnover and employment.   
The latest available ONS data24 show that in 2015, Scotland had 1,865 high growth firms, 
around 1% of total of Scottish firms.  
This ONS database records every company in Scotland with 10+ employees and calculates their 
growth based on both turnover and number of employees over the previous three years. Using 
growth based on turnover, Scotland had 7.31% of the 8.öV total high growth firms and 6.81% 
when using growth based on employees.  
Therefore, considering Scotland appears to be near its õIDLU VKDUHö of high growth firms (which 
would equate to around 8%), the remainder of this paper explores how many of these Scottish 
high growth firms are top performing within the 8.öV top high growth firms. We focus on four key 
questions: 
23 https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/56659/1/FEC_40_1_2016_HopkinsPRichmondK.pdf  
24https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/changestobusiness/businessbirthsdeathsandsurvivalrates/a
dhocs/007659highgrowthenterprises  
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 Does Scotland have its õIDLU VKDUHö (i.e. a per capita share) of the 8.öV top performing high
growth firms?
 Has 6FRWODQGöV performance improved or deteriorated over time?
 Are previously top high growth firms from earlier years still successful?
 How does 6FRWODQGöV performance in producing HGFs compare to other UK regions?
To assess 6FRWODQGöV current performance in relation to the UK in producing fast growing 
companies, two main data sources were used (See Table 1): 
Sunday Times Virgin Fast Track 10025 ó this is an annual list which ranks Britainös 100 private 
companies with the fastest growing sales over their latest three years. It covers growth 
companies from all sectors apart from technology. It has been produced since 1997. 
Sunday Times Hiscox Tech Track 10026 ó an annual list produced which ranks Britainös 100 
private tech companies with the fastest growing sales over their past three years. It has been 
produced since 2001.    
Again there are weaknesses in using just these datasets. In particular, the focus is only on 
private sector companies. However, they do provide a useful illustration of key trends and 
performance.  
The Fast Track 2016 and Tech Track 2016 lists were analysed separately and then combined. 
This combined list of the fastest growing 100 Fast Track and Tech Track firms comprises 53 
Fast Track Tech firms and 47 Fast Track firms.  
6FRWODQGöV õIDLU VKDUHö of the top 100 high growing firms in the UK would equate to around 8% 
of the UK total.   
As Table 1 shows, 6FRWODQGöV share of such form is lower-than-expected, were the ratio to be in 
line with a per capita or economy-wide share.  
Scotland performed better in the tech sector with seven Scottish companies featured in the 
8.öV top 100 fastest growing technology firms, though it still fell short of a per capita share. 
Table 1: Percentage of Scottish firms in top 100 UK lists 
% of Scottish HGFs Average Growth UK Average Growth 
Fast Track 100 2016 3 58.7% 82.4% 
Tech Track 100 2016 7 66.9% 87.9% 
Fast & Tech Track 100 Combined 2016 2 107.2% 114.9% 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
25 http://www.fasttrack.co.uk/league-tables/fast-track-100/ 
26 http://www.fasttrack.co.uk/league-tables/tech-track-100/ 
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Using the combined top 100 UK, only two Scottish companies appear. 
Within the UK regions, Scotland has amongst the lowest representation, with Wales (2 
companies) and Northern Ireland (no companies).  In stark contrast, Greater London has the 
highest proportion with 41 companies, followed by the South East (14 companies).   
The two Scottish companies featured are both tech companies: 
 FanDuel, a fantasy sports game developer which has been a very successful company since
its foundation in Edinburgh in 2009. However, since this list was compiled, FanDuel has
moved its HQ to New York due to its success in the US. It still has many offices in Edinburgh.
 ECS Security, an IT infrastructure consultancy founded in Glasgow in 2008, whose customers
include three of the 8.öV five biggest banks.
Companies which are featured in the individual Fast Track and Tech Track lists include 
BrewDog (craft brewer), Skyscanner (travel search engine) and RHA (headphone designers). 
These companies do not make the top 100 combined UK list but still meet the 2(&'öV 
definition of a high growth firm with annual growth rates over the last three years well above 
20%. Skyscanner appeared in the Tech Track 100 lists for a record seven consecutive years in 
2016 but does not featured in the 2017 list as it has been acquired by Chinese company Ctrip, 
although it is still headquartered in Edinburgh.  
Of the 10 Scottish companies featured in the top 200 UK Fast and Tech Track lists, eight of 
them are located in 6FRWODQGöV biggest cities Glasgow and Edinburgh. The remaining two are 
located in areas surrounding Glasgow and Aberdeen. Moreover, at the time of listing in 2016, 8 
of them had been founded within the past 10 years.  
The average annual growth for the Scottish companies listed is 20% less than the UK average 
in both the Fast Track and Tech Track 2016 individual lists. The average annual growth for 
Scottish companies in the combined list is 7.7% less than the UK average, likely due to the fact 
there are only two companies and one of them (FanDuel) has a very high annual growth over 
three years of 128.2%.  In summary, Scotland has arguably underperformed in both the 
quantity of HGFs it is producing compared to the UK and also in their average growth rate. 
4. Has 6FRWODQGöV performance improved over time?
The Fast Track 100 league tables have been produced since 1997 and the Tech Track since 
2001.  
6FRWODQGöV performance has fluctuated since 2001. The overall trend in each list appears to be 
that Scotland has had a below per capita share for most years.  
6FRWODQGöV performance declined generally after highs in 2002 and 2003, reaching lows 
around 2009. After 2009, 6FRWODQGöV performance picked up and companies in each list 
experienced an increase over the following few years, particularly in 2012.  
Figure 3: Number of Scottish firms in each list since 2001 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Sources: Sunday Times Fast and Sunday Times Tech Track 2001 - 2016   
________________________________________________________________________________ 
A closer look at the combined top 100 Fast Track and Tech Track list shows Scotland has only 
had its fair share three times; in 2002, 2003 and 2012. It experienced lows in 2001 and 2009, 
with only one company featured in each year. 2016 is amongst the lowest represented year 
with two companies. On average, Scotland has 4-5 companies featured in the 8.öV top 100.   
Comparing 6FRWODQGöV performance to other parts of the UK shows a mixed picture (See Figure 
4). Greater London and the South East of England dominate the 8.öV high growth lists. 
Scotland performs averagely in comparison with the remaining UK regions. Since 2011 it has 
produced similar numbers of top high growth firms as the West Midlands, the South West and 
Yorkshire and the Humber. Scotland performs better than Wales, Northern Ireland and the 
North East which have all had no listed companies in several years since 2001.  
Since 2001, 50 different Scottish companies have featured in the combined top 100 lists, with 
some of them appearing in consecutive years. There is a fairly even split of 24 tech and 26 non 
tech companies. And the geographical location of these companies are fairly similar.  
Since 2001, approximately 72% of the Scottish companies on this list have been located in 
Edinburgh, Glasgow and Aberdeen (see Figure 5), with many of the remaining companies 
located close to the cities, especially to Edinburgh. 
 Fraser of Allander Institute
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Figure 4: Percentage of high growth firms by region in combined Fast & Tech track lists since 
2001 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Sources: Sunday Times Fast and Sunday Times Tech Track 2001 - 2016   
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 5: Locations of the Scottish HGFs listed 2001 - 2016 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Sources: Sunday Times Fast and Sunday Times Tech Track 2001 - 2016   
________________________________________________________________________________ 
The Scottish companies featured in this list operate in a variety of sectors and industries. Of 
the 50 Scottish companies listed since 2001, 24 of them have been from the Tech Track 
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technology list (see Figure 6). These companies are most heavily concentrated in Business & 
Recruitment Services, Engineering & Manufacturing, Retail and IT Services.  
Figure 6:  Sectoral breakdown of the Scottish listed HGFs 2001 - 2016 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Sources: Sunday Times Fast and Sunday Times Tech Track 2001 - 2016   
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 7: UK and Scottish Average annual growth 2001 - 2016 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Sources: Sunday Times Fast and Sunday Times Tech Track 2001 - 2016   
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Both Scotland and the UK as a whole appear to have experienced a steady decline in average 
annual sales growth in the top 100 companies, although their growth is still well above the 
20% growth rate which the OECD definition requires (see Figure 7). Scotland performs similarly 
to the UK average. However, this is due to there being a smaller number of Scottish companies 
listed, some of whom have higher growth rates than the UK average. 
Scotland had its highest average annual growth rate of 164% in 2004, compared to 165% in 
the UK. Since 2001, its lowest average annual growth rates were in 2008, 2009 and 2012. This 
again may be linked to the financial crisis in 2008.  
The average age of Scottish companies at the time of inclusion on the listing is 10.5 years old. 
Excluding Hunter Boot, the Wellington boot retailer founded in 1856, and Barrhead Travel 
agency founded in 1975, all of the companies were founded after 1989. With these 
exceptions, the average age is just over 8 years old. 
5. Where are the high growth firms now?
Many of the Scottish companies featured in the combined top 100 UK lists are still thriving 
successful companies today - see Figure 8. But of the 50 Scottish companies which have made 
it onto these lists since 2001, it would appear that over 40% of them have either been 
acquired by UK or foreign companies or no longer exist.  
Figure 8: Current status of the 50 Scottish HGFS listed 2001 ó 2016 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
Sources: Sunday Times Fast and Sunday Times Tech Track 2001 - 2016   
________________________________________________________________________________ 
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The majority of the companies which no longer exist or have been taken over come from the 
earlier listings. Of the 23 companies listed between 2001 and 2006, approximately 65% of 
them no longer exist or have been acquired.  
6. Conclusions
This article has examined 6FRWODQGöV performance in producing successful and high-growth 
companies. Based on the research undertaken, the following conclusions may be drawn. 
 6FRWODQGöV top high growth companies are relatively long-standing with most having
been founded before 1960, and many before 1900.
 Compared to the UK and the US, Scotland has a higher proportion of younger, high
growth companies (perhaps as a result of consistent acquisition of Scottish HGFs).
 Scotland tends to have slightly fewer top UK performing high growth firms than its
economy-share would suggest.
 The majority of 6FRWODQGöV top high growth firms are located in Glasgow and Edinburgh
(62%).
 The majority (65%) of 6FRWODQGöV high growth companies are found in Business and
Recruitment Services, IT Services, Engineering & Manufacturing, Retail and Health
sectors.
 Over a third of 6FRWODQGöV top high growth companies have been acquired by UK and
foreign companies over the past two decades.
Further research on the performance of 6FRWODQGöV high growth firms (HGFs) could usefully 
focus on assessing 6FRWODQGöV performance in a European context, specifically comparing 
Scotland to similarly sized countries such as Finland, Denmark and Norway.  
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